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**NAVAL
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THESIS

**AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH AMERICAN RELATIONS:
IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION**

by

Ali Güngör Işıklar

December 2008

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Scott N. Siegel

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**AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Turkish-American relations date back to the 1800s; however, they were far from well developed and did not solidify until the end of World War II. After an alliance of fifty years, the Second Iraq War indicated doomsday scenarios in terms of U.S.-Turkish relations in the minds of many scholars. The Turkish Parliament's rejection of the proposal of a second Turkish front for American troops in Northern Iraq, as well as, the July 4 incident in Sulaymaniyah in 2003, froze the dynamics of the relations.

Yet, when the history of the relations from the end of World War II until 2003 is examined carefully, it should be clear that every time there was a deterioration of the mutual relations, they were replaced by a period of improvement, as the common interests of both countries outweigh the differences. This thesis aims to show that regardless of the level of deterioration, in terms of mutual relations, Turkish-American relations are inclined to improve. For this reason, it can be assumed that the deteriorated relations of the Second Iraq War will follow the trend toward improvement in the future.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis treats the past and present of bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S., mainly after WWII. The main goal of this thesis is to allow a dispassionate analysis of these bilateral relations and, the author hopes, to improve the future of these relations by examining their history. The immediate past has seen great strain in U.S.-Turkish relations as a result of the geopolitical turmoil connected with the confluence of the Middle East and Europe. In search of the essence of U.S.-Turkish bi-lateral relations in the record of the past, the author often came across some definite periods of deterioration caused by such factors as the international system and domestic politics. However, these events were followed by improvement in bi-lateral relations as a result of sound statecraft on both sides. Therefore, it could be said that each nation has sought to strengthen its ties in spite of period of friction and tension. Since Turkey and the U.S. have different geography, interest, power, culture, and so forth, these differences have caused deterioration at certain times of crisis. This phenomenon did not, however, end with a break of all ties; instead it strengthened relations by reversing itself into an improvement period because of enduring interests and sound statecraft. From the author's perspective, this fact demonstrates that the core interests are the same for the two countries, but the details of policy and statecraft can and do differ. Hence, enhanced interaction and mutual understanding will smooth relations in the end.

Turkey and the U.S. have been sharing a strategic partnership for nearly 200 years. The relations between the two countries date back to a treaty of 1830 between the U.S. and the Ottoman Empire. However, this agreement failed to improve further relations between the two countries. After WWI, a new country, the Republic of Turkey was born, yet relations with the U.S. were still weak at this time due to significant internal problems in Turkey and the legacy of the recent war in U.S. statecraft. Nonetheless, the end of WWII set up the Soviets as the Communist threat in the international arena. Eventually, the U.S., the only superpower able to resist the Soviets,

decided to assist the Mediterranean countries in order to impede the Communist effect over vulnerable European countries. In this light, the very first seeds of a real alliance were cultivated between Turkey and the U.S. in the late 1940s.

Instead of a true strategic partnership, a “patron-client relationship”¹ was developed between Turkey and the U.S. from 1945 to 1964. Ankara was the recipient of all kind of military supplies from Washington and adjusted its interests in compliance with Washington’s goals for NATO policy. Although Ankara was in favor of a complete convergence of common interests, some of the interests were too different and proved the impossibility of a total convergence between a global power and a regional power. However, despite some tough experiences like the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and unilateral actions, this period emerged as a time of improvement. After every deterioration in the relationship, a period of improvement followed due to critical common interests.

Between 1964 and 1980, the difficulties associated with the evolution of Cyprus undermined the relationship. President Johnson’s letter deterring Turkey from executing operations in Cyprus was the beginning of the decline in relations until the end of the arms embargo in 1978.² Johnson’s letter pushed Ankara to question its relationship with Washington. Therefore, Ankara changed its policy, in this period, toward a policy that was less dependent on Washington. Eventually, the “patron-client relationship” was weakened due to Ankara’s attempts at independence. Washington’s pressures on Ankara, which related to the reduction of opium production in Turkey, played into Ankara’s hands in terms of more independent policies. Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, the relations tracked onto the improvement path again.

After 1980, the bilateral relations were accelerated and gradually solidified on the basis of a strategic partnership perception, which essentially began to be formed in the

¹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003, A History of a Distinctive Alliance* (NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003), 24.

² Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Relations, “*Turkish-U.S. Political Relations*,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/NorthAmerica/USA/USA_Political.htm (accessed March 17, 2008).

First Iraq War. Clinton's declarations, indicating the importance of Turkey on the strategic partnership basis, brought the two countries closer.

The September 11 2001 attack on the U.S. was a keystone in the relations. Turkey's efforts against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, and all kinds of terrorism, for twenty years, underpinned the importance of partnership in the initiatives against global terrorism.³ With this concept, from 1980 to 2003, the relations experienced a phase of close cooperation and amicable statecraft.

Relations, however, became unsustainable again after the second Gulf War with the rejection of a resolution by the Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003, regarding the approval of a second Turkish front for American troops in Northern Iraq and the Sulaymaniyah incident of July 4, where Turkish soldiers had sacks put over their heads and were arrested by American soldiers, which created a divergence in the relations. Indeed, this was the most sensitive, fragile, and shocking incident during the relationship since WWII. Most of the press organizations and other authors interpreted the strategic relationship as having ended. In contrast, as the author of this thesis argues, the relations were put on track by both sides again by means of mutual diplomatic and political efforts. Political leaders and high-ranking officials made frequent mutual visits in order to overcome the problems. Eventually, indications of friendly and strategic tones within the relationship, started to slide toward the positive side again.

These unstable periods of time brought up the question; "How will relations between the two countries be in the future?"; "Will these incidents of post-Iraq War cause a great antipathy toward Turkish citizens?" A more detailed examination of the past relationship between the two countries may enable the U.S. to make correct predictions about the future of U.S.-Turkish relations. This thesis aims to make sense of the relations between two countries after the Iraq invasion, and to illuminate such diplomacy on the basis of history.

³ Rachel Prager, "Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues," *Georgetown University*, 2003, 11.

Since there were many ups and downs in the relationship, it is useful to separate the chapters according to these periods of crisis and relative amity and unproblematic diplomacy. With this goal in mind, the second chapter takes a look into the period of the Cold War in which Turkey was an important partner or client for the U.S. Due to the need to contain the Soviet Union, the U.S. organized a strategic plan and undertook some actions, including the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. During this time, Turkey completely re-adjusted its foreign policy to be in line with Washington's in terms of a real alliance. However, toward the beginning of the 1960s, the Cuban Missile Crisis proved that it was impossible for Turkey, as a small state, to completely align its foreign policy with a superpower. Fortunately, this was not a real problem as common interests were still effective.

In the third chapter, the events of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, in which the Cyprus Crisis between Greece and Turkey blew up, are explained. Ankara and Washington experienced their first significant divergence at this time. The debate over Cyprus resulted in a huge disappointment for Turkey, with President Johnson's letter in 1964, since Washington had different interests as far as Cyprus as a global power. In addition, the demands of the U.S. regarding the reduction of opium production instigated a high level of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Yet, reemergence of the Soviet threat by means of the Afghanistan invasion and the U.S. embassy incident in Iran demonstrated that Washington needed the support of a trustworthy ally in the region: Turkey. Thus, concerns secondary to strategic common interests were erased from the bilateral agenda once again.

The fourth chapter mainly discusses the period after the 1980s, in terms of improvement in relations, the First Gulf War, operations in the Balkans, and after 9/11. Turkish-American relations developed and furthered a very friendly and strategic concept in this period. Ankara's support of Washington in the First Gulf War was extended to the fight against terrorism after 9/11, which was essential, as it indicated that these operations were not just against Muslims.

Lastly, the fifth chapter defines the current situation after the Second Gulf War. The rejection of the resolution by the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 and the

Sulaymaniyah incident were the worst experiences in regards to relations since the letter from President Johnson. Lacking sensitivity, tolerance, and respect for mutual interests yielded doomsday for U.S.-Turkish relations. Yet, recall for sensitivity and more understanding was taken seriously by the politicians, and boosted the indicator of the relations from the bottom to the top. Mutual efforts by politicians achieved the restoration of relations to a friendly atmosphere once again.

As a result, despite the non-friendly periods, Turkey and the U.S. shared common interests at the core. Since both countries suffer in times of deterioration, they always focus on improving relations. However, it is impossible to align all the interests of a regional power with a global power. Yet, these areas of potential friction can be overcome by mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect. Overall, instead of fighting over the smaller issues, both sides should focus on the big picture, without harming the sensitivities of the other.

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II. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM THE END OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNTIL 1964 CYPRUS CRISIS

Since the end of WWII, Turkey and the U.S. have been cooperating on key security issues. Although this cooperation is defined as a strategic partnership, it was, in author's opinion not a true strategic partnership in the period between 1945 and 1963. Turkish-American relations during this time should have been defined as a "patron-client relationship"⁴ instead granted the nature of the bi-lateral relations in the cold war.

The alliance was established in the era 1949-1952 for several reasons. The first reason for a Turkish-American alliance was *security*. Turkish-American interests converged on the concept that Turkey was under severe threat of Soviet aggression and the U.S. was worried about the expansion of Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Secondly, "Turkey's need for military and economic assistance," which was supplied by Washington in the 1950s, appeared as another reason for the alliance. Turkey was suffering economically and militarily after the Independence War. Thus, to contain the Soviets, Turkey needed aid and the U.S. supplied the aid for that reason. The third point is the *strategic reasons*. From the Turkish point of view, nobody else could halt the Soviets but the U.S. From Washington's point of view, Turkey was located in a strategic place "that constituted a natural barrier between two regions." Therefore, Turkey should be kept "in the Western camp." The fourth reason is the *ideological dimension* of the alliance. For Turkey there were no options but Westernization, since Ataturk had pointed this way for success. Hence, Turkey followed Western policies to satisfy its ally, the U.S., as Washington was in favor of Turkey's national policies. Eventually, this policy caused some acrimony in the relations during certain time periods. *Internal reasons* may appear as another

⁴ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 13.

significant actor in terms of forming alliances. This was a valid reason for Ankara as it saw Washington as “the insurance of Turkey’s democratic political and democratic process.”⁵

In Ataturk’s time, in the 1920s through the Second World War, Turkey preferred the neutrality option since it was afraid of the devastating effect of another war into which Turkey might have been drawn because of an alliance. Thus, Turkey focused on domestic affairs and maintained its friendly relations with all the countries in the world without forming alliances. When Ankara realized that neutrality became a choice after World War II, as the Soviets emerged as a significant threat, the U.S. was seen as the mandatory direction for Ankara due to its capacity to contain the Soviets. In this context, Turkey and the U.S., taking into consideration all the reasons above, decided to intensify their relations. The alliance grew out of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in terms of security concerns, and Turkey’s need for assistance. It was solidified with Turkey becoming a member of NATO in 1952. Thus, in the beginning of the 1950s, Washington supplied everything to Ankara that it needed, and in return, Ankara followed orders from Washington, as the Soviets were still a threat. Because of the remoteness of the U.S., Turkey welcomed U.S. military facilities in its territory in the 1950s in case a quick response to a Soviet attack became necessary. Moreover, especially during the Menderes government of the 1950s, Washington was seen as the insurance of the democratic process in Turkey.

However, the close cooperation lost some impetus toward the end of the 1950s. Some reasons for establishing alliances have been mentioned above. In contrast, there are some reasons that eroded the alliance. The *costs-benefit* issue occupied an important place in the agenda of Turkish-American relations. Through the end of the 1950s, leftists in Turkey increased their voices against the costs of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in a manner typical of other continental European countries. Their main concerns were focused on becoming the target of another country (either an enemy or a neighbor) and losing some “independence, status, prestige, and influence” due to the alliance. The Lebanon case and

⁵ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 13-18.

the status of American soldiers and facilities in Turkey were taken into consideration in this concept. Moreover, the U.S. was gaining more than Turkey, a fact that was strongly criticized by leftists in the media. Another factor was the “cohesion of alliance.” After the Soviet threat decreased in the early 1960s, both countries began to act more unilaterally. This was the case when the U.S. removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey without any consultation in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Since Turkey was a sensitive country in terms of its identity, nationality and capacity, the removal of the missiles, without any consultation, rankled Ankara as giving substance to the critics of NATO as to the willfulness of the Americans at the expense of those they claimed to defend. The important point is that in spite of this, Turkish-American relations were maintained at a high level as both sides needed the support of the other. All sides recognized that fluctuations in the alliance were temporary. However, a convergence of ideas on key issues yielded a strong alliance in this period.

A. ATATURK PERIOD (1923-1938)

The first official relations between Turkey and the United States (U.S.) were economic rather than diplomatic. Sources regarding relations between these two countries are very restricted, especially during the period between World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII). This is due to several reasons, some of which include: (a) the implementation of the Monroe Doctrine by the U.S., which resulted in America being isolated from the rest of the world;⁶ (b) the inability to access official Turkish archives during those years; (c) the formulation of the Turkish Foreign Policy “in those years [only by] President Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, and the Foreign Minister Tevfik Rustu Aras...on a limited scale, and usually in general terms;”⁷ and (d) the Economic Crisis of 1929 resulting in an “American...isolation strategy during that period.”⁸

⁶ Fahir Armaoglu, “Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri,” *Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi* 38 (1997): 1.

⁷ Aryeh Scmuelevitz, “Ataturk’s Policy Towards Great Powers: Principles and Guidelines,” *Society’s Quarterly Voice of Ataturk*, 1.

⁸ Omer Goksel Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 4, no. 3, (Fall 2005): 21.

In 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected president of the U.S. While he thought the Ottoman Empire would collapse in the very near future, he did not assign an ambassador to Istanbul. Prior to the U.S. declaring war on Germany in April of 1917, the Ottoman Empire ceased diplomatic relations with the U.S. When the U.S. declared war on Germany, Germany strongly encouraged the Ottoman Empire to declare war on the U.S. During this time, the U.S. followed a neutrality policy toward the Ottoman Empire, but kept their concerns, which were focused on American schools (426), missionary centers (17), and American hospitals (9)⁹ within Turkey's borders. To alleviate these concerns, the Ottoman Empire declared that all the rights of these American institutions were guaranteed, despite the recent recession, and that relations would be the same as before.¹⁰

In fact, American relations with the new Turkish Republic became more concrete after the declaration of Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1918 because point twelve was directly related to the Turkish Republic. Point twelve states: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."¹¹ This principle brought hope for the Ottoman Empire prior to signing the Armistice of Moudros; however, Ataturk initiated a National Struggle. After being encouraged by Wilson's twelfth point, Ataturk searched for ways to improve relations with the U.S. His first unofficial attempt to introduce the Turkish National Struggle to the U.S. was made toward General James Harbord, who was assigned by the Paris Conference to conduct a "fact-finding mission"¹² regarding the

⁹ Doc. Dr. Necmettin Tozlu, "Kultur ve Egitim Tarihimizde Yabanci Okullar," *Ankara: Akcag*, 1991, 78.

¹⁰ Fahir Armaoglu, "Turkiye'deki Amerikan Okullari Krizi 1927-1928," *Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi* 37 (March 1997): Cilt XIII, 1.

¹¹ Woodrow Wilson, Wilson's speech in the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918.

¹² Kara Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 8.

Armenians in Sivas.¹³ In discussions between Ataturk and General Harbord, Ataturk succeeded in relaying the aims of the Turkish National Struggle and won the general's sympathy.¹⁴

The first official attempt by the Ankara government to introduce the Turkish National Struggle to the U.S. was during the Independence War in January 1921, but was refused by Washington.¹⁵ Ataturk got his first victory when America sent Diplomat Robert W. Imbrie to visit the Ankara Government in June 1922. Imbrie's visit had many positive effects on the American Minister of Foreign Affairs and the American press in terms of friendly feelings between the two countries.¹⁶ Later that same year, "a prominent American journalist named Isaac Frederick Marcossen came to Ankara...where he had an opportunity to interview Mustafa Kemal."¹⁷ This interview was very important and reflected Ataturk's view on the U.S. Ataturk said,

The American ideal is our ideal. As you had a Declaration of Independence, we also have our National Pact. Both of these documents are of the same nature; like you, we also wanted independence. Turkey and America are democratic societies. Turkey and the United States can cooperate in the commercial and economic fields. We welcome the entry of American capital into Turkey. I carefully examined the lives of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The United States of America was founded upon thirteen governments; there is a similarity between the present day Turkey and these thirteen governments. You Americans liberated yourselves from the yoke of the English; we also won our independence from them. The world should witness the birth of a new nation in Turkey. Do you know why I liked Washington and Lincoln? Both worked for the advancement, elevation, and prosperity of America. However, your other presidents strove to gain honor and fame. This high service is the service which a person assumes without thinking of himself. You perhaps find such a statement of a man like me who is both a soldier

¹³ Hulki Cevizoglu, *Isgal ve Direnis 1919 ve Bugun* (Ankara: Ceviz Kabugu Yayınlari, 2007), 299-300.

¹⁴ Fahir Armaoglu, "Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri," *Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi* 38 (1997): 1, 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁷ Ayse Cebesoy Sarialp, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasa (Ataturk) and an American Journalist," *Society's Quarterly Voice of Ataturk*, 1.

and a Turk a bit strange; but in these ideas laid the foundation of the entire nation. The Turks were in a position of minority in the Ottoman Empire for centuries, but now the Ottoman Empire has ceased to exist. Now, we Turks alone control our own homeland, we are the masters of our own house.¹⁸

It is clear that Ataturk tried to gain the support of the U.S. during the National Struggle years in order to establish a balance of power with the Western powers, such as Britain, France and Italy, who were enemies of the Turkish State at that time. It is hard to say that he was successful in his plans since America always rejected Turkish proposals and acted in compliance with the Western powers. The main reason for this American behavior was the American interest in Turkish territory, which was clearly declared at the Lausanne Conference after the end of the war: equality of opportunity over Turkish territory; permanence of American schools and other institutions; and a new Armenian State in the Eastern part of Turkey. Because of these ongoing problems, the U.S. Senate did not approve the General Agreement between Turkey and America after the Lausanne Conference.

Relations returned to a normal level after a Modus Vivendi¹⁹ and the reciprocal assignment of ambassadors in 1927.²⁰ This stability, however, was hampered by an incident at Bursa American Girls College in 1928, which resulted in the closure of the school.²¹ Three Turkish students decided to become Christians through the influence of some American teachers; this event was seen as sabotage to secularism by the Turkish government. Despite the objections of American ambassador Grew, these teachers were judged in Turkish courts and deported to the U.S.²² In addition, renewal of the Neutrality

¹⁸ Ayse Cebesoy Sarialp, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasa (Ataturk) and an American Journalist," *Society's Quarterly Voice of Ataturk*, 1.

¹⁹ Rifat Ucarol, *Siyasi Tarih* (Istanbul: Filiz Kitapevi, 2000), 576.

²⁰ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Turk-Amerikan Munasebetlerine Kisa Bir Bakis (1800-1959)*, Ankara 1959, 43-44.

²¹ Ayten Sezer, "Osmanli'dan Cumhuriyete; misyonerlerin Turkiye'deki Egitimve Ogretim Faaliyetleri," *Hacettepe Universitesi Edebiyat Fakultesi Dergisi Special Edition* (1999), 179, also available www.edebiyatdergisi.hacettepe.edu.tr/700ozelAytenSezer.pdf (accessed August 16, 2008).

²² Armaoglu, "Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri," 1, 7.

and Friendship Commitment between Turkey and the Soviet Union forced the U.S. to be more cautious of their relationship with Turkey.

Tensions were reduced and relations were once again put back on track thanks to the close personal friendship between Ataturk and Roosevelt that had existed since 1932. They kept in touch with each other through condolence, celebration, or personal letters until the death of Ataturk. The New York Times published two letters with permission from Roosevelt on July 10, 1937, captioning them “Roosevelt Lauds Ataturk’s Regime...”²³

Turkey and America had improved friendly relations with little exception during Ataturk’s time, but were far from having a strategic partnership. First, Ataturk focused on internal affairs and was against the participation of military organizations. “Turkey has avoided a large scale war for over 80 years. Aptulahat Aksin, the first Turkish ambassador to Syria, stated that Ataturk generally disliked military alliances and pacts believing that they caused insecurities in neighbor nations, which would be contrary to Turkey’s interests. In Ataturk’s time, Turkey’s position was non-alignment due to its need to accomplish internal reforms and create a strong, modern state.”²⁴ At this time, both countries were pursuing isolation policies due to internal problems in their own countries.

Turkey did not give up her neutrality promise despite pressure from the Western Allies during WWII. She “maintained strict neutrality during critical stages of the war, mainly in accordance with the principle that a nation should fight only in case of real danger to its national independence and territorial integrity — more so since, in this case, any involvement in war could truly be a danger in both these respects. However, following World War II, Turkish leaders evidently felt there was no other choice but to return to that principle of Atatürk, which viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat to

²³ Armaoglu, “Ataturk Doneminde Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri,” 10.

²⁴ Cathleen Boivin, Speech made at the Youth Day celebration in Washington, D.C., May 19, 2004, 4.

Turkey's security, and to look for an ally in the West — this time the United States, together with the Western European powers.”²⁵ The first settlement of a strategic partnership was arising.

B. SECOND WORLD WAR AND IMMEDIATE POST WAR YEARS

The Second World War ended as Ataturk had predicted in one of his conversations with American General Douglas MacArthur in 1935. According to Ataturk,

The Versailles peace settlement will not end the reasons that started the World War...If authorities in Europe do not get together on the basis of controversies of political contacts and try to placate their own hatreds and interests, it will be tragic...The victorious power after the war between 1940 and 1945 will not be England, France, or Germany, but Bolshevism...Bolshevism is getting to be a great threat to Europe and Asia.²⁶

After the devastating effects of WWII, only two countries emerged as superpowers: the U.S. and the USSR. “Despite surviving the Second World War virtually unscathed, Turkey however, was soon to see that the situation after the war was demanding careful diplomacy as much as it had done previously. Throughout the war, Inonu [Turkish President] came to the conclusion that Turkey’s biggest problem after the war would be the prospect of facing all alone the more powerful Soviet Union.”²⁷ Although Turkey had followed a neutrality policy before WWII, it was difficult to maintain this policy in the new system of bipolar structure.²⁸ As a result, Turkey shifted its policy toward an alignment with the West to escape the Soviet threat.

The aggressive demands of the Soviet Union were constant during WWII, but increased toward the end. As a precaution, Turkey mobilized its troops to the Edirne-

²⁵ Scmuelevitz, “Ataturk’s Policy towards Great Powers: Principles and Guidelines,” 4.

²⁶ Prof. Mahmut Esat Ozan, “Ataturk’s Prophesies: Why Douglas MacArthur Believed in them too?” *Voice of Ataturk*, 1, <http://www.ataturksociety.org/asa/voa/ozan.html> (accessed August 21, 2008).

²⁷ Mustafa Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1, (January 2000): 105.

²⁸ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 106.

Catalca and Kars-Ardahan lines. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the Soviets demonstrated their desire to have bases on the Straits and to gain territories in the eastern part of Turkey, which became an official demand after June 7, 1945. Meanwhile, on 19 March 1945, the Soviets denounced “the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression.”²⁹

Although Turkey rejected all Soviet demands, the Soviets continued to put pressure on Turkey on an increasing scale. Thus, Turkey “unsuccessfully tried to involve the United States in defending Turkey against the Soviet Union and bring the United States’ position on the Straits into harmony with the minimum Turkish view.”³⁰ The keystone was July 1946, when the Soviets demanded “the sole control of the Straits by the Black Sea Powers.”³¹ Turkey rejected this proposal, but this time with the full support of the U.S., Britain, and France. Moreover, “the United States announced its intention to maintain a permanent naval presence in Mediterranean.”³² Turkish-American relations were beginning to be woven in a strategic dimension for the first time in history.

Consequently, Turkey began to occupy an important place in the U.S. foreign affairs with Greece. Turkey was seen as the key country for the U.S. to encircle and stop the Soviet Union expansion. Turkey’s geographical position was a natural obstacle for the Soviet Union’s expansion toward the Middle East and the Mediterranean.³³ But according to Truman, although “the Turkish Government...rejected the Soviet demands

²⁹ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 107.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Joseph C. Satterthwaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 401, America and the Middle East*, (May 1972): 77.

³² Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 108.

³³ Yavuz Guler, “II. Dünya Harbi Sonrası Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1945-1950),” *Gazi Universitesi Kirsehir Egitim Fakultesi*, Cilt 5, Sayı 2, (2004): 210.

and showed admirable determination to resist...Turkey's army, though sizable, was poorly equipped and would have been no match for the battle-tested divisions of the Kremlin.”³⁴

In April 1946, the U.S. demonstrated its desire to improve relations by sending the U.S.S. Missouri to Istanbul, which was deeply appreciated and celebrated by the Turkish public and press. Even though “the ship was merely bearing the remains of the late Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegun, who had died in Washington in 1944, the signal being sent to the USSR and the Turkish public was clear.”³⁵

C. TRUMAN DOCTRINE

At the end of 1946, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey reported from Ankara that “Turkey will not be able to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Soviet Union. The burden is too great for the nation’s economy to carry much longer.”³⁶ Just two months after this report, on February 21, 1947, the British Government declared its withdrawal from the region because of its own domestic problems. The withdrawal of British troops from Greece would endanger the security of Turkey and the Middle East in the case of a Soviet expansion. “Turkey, the only country in the area with an army strong enough to make the Russians hesitate, would find itself in an untenable position. Therefore the United States, by filling the gap caused by the British withdrawal, [had to] show a greater determination to resist this Communist drive...”³⁷

After much deliberation between President Truman and his advisers, they concluded that the protection of stability in Greece and Turkey was vital to U.S. security

³⁴ Satterthwaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 401, *America and the Middle East*, 77, also see *Memoirs* of President Truman.

³⁵ Turgut Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964 Johnson Letter: Lessons For the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions* (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004), 9-10.

³⁶ Satterthwaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 401, *America and the Middle East*, 77.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 75.

interests. “According to the predictions, if the Soviet Union controlled Turkey, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean could also succumb to Soviet rule, and Communist ideology would harm the vital interests of the United States in that region.”³⁸ Thus, the U.S. decided to revise its foreign policy and began to support Turkey and Greece economically; this is known as the Truman Doctrine.

After WWII, Turkey was forced to find an ally. The U.S. was seen as “the leader and protector of the Western Democracies and it was the only country capable of lending money which Turkey’s economy badly needed at that time.”³⁹ In addition, the U.S. and Turkey were located very far from each other geographically, which made an important argument for the Turkish Government to gain the U.S. as a new ally.⁴⁰ The most important factor, however, to move toward the Western camp, was the result of the historical Soviet threat “as Khrushchev put it: the Soviet demands succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans.”⁴¹

In his famous speech on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman defined the vital reasons for the aid to Greece and Turkey as follows:

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East...Turkey has sought additional financial assistance...for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential for the preservation of order in the Middle East...If we falter in our leadership we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.⁴²

After his speech, the President asked Congress for \$400 million in aid until the end of June 1948; Turkey was to receive a quarter (\$100 million) of this aid. After

³⁸ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 9-10.

³⁹ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 109.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Turgut, *An Analysis of the 1964 Johnson Letter: Lessons For the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 9.

⁴² Quoted in: Satterthwaite, The Truman Doctrine, 78 from Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2: *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955), 97-98.

President Truman signed the bill on May 22, 1947, the aid was officially authorized. In his memoirs, President Truman underlines this aid as his most important decision after bombing Hiroshima.⁴³

According to the Truman Doctrine, Turkey would be supplied not only financially but also with service and intelligence. America authorized military and civilian personnel to check whether the aid was directed properly in compliance with American Public Law 75. This law also provided for the training and education of Turkish and Greek personnel in the U.S.⁴⁴

Despite the many benefits of the Truman aid, Turkey was concerned by some parts of the law regarding the historic experiments in capitulation. Turkey's "objection to use the word "administrator" was solved by naming the ambassador *chief of the mission*, with the heads of the army, air force, navy and roads groups having the title of *director*."⁴⁵ Additional concerns were eliminated after successful negotiations. Finally, Turkey and the U.S. signed the aid program on July 12, 1947; the fourth point, however, would pose a problem when Turkey initiated an operation on Cyprus in 1964.

The Truman Doctrine was significant in various ways. First of all, U.S. national interests were to support "Turkey and Greece against the common enemy, the Soviets, or Communism as another way to put it."⁴⁶ Secondly, the aid was given to two countries who had previously defined each other as *enemy*. (These countries later disagreed on Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s.) Consequently, the Truman Doctrine was the key for reciprocal relations between Turkey and the U.S.; by receiving aid, Turkey was "no

⁴³ Guler, "II. Dünya Harbi Sonrası Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1945-1950)," *Gazi Üniversitesi Kirşehir Eğitim Fakültesi*, 216.

⁴⁴ Guler, "II. Dünya Harbi Sonrası Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1945-1950)," *Gazi Üniversitesi Kirşehir Eğitim Fakültesi*, 216.

⁴⁵ "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vo. 401, *America and the Middle East*, 79.

⁴⁶ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 10.

longer isolated.”⁴⁷ By forming an alliance with mutual need, Turkey became more comfortable and self-confident in the region. Lastly, it was the first signal of the Cold War, as well as “the containment policy of the U.S. against the Soviets.”⁴⁸

D. MARSHALL PLAN

After WWII, the economies of many European countries were totally destroyed. They had consumed all of their economic resources during the war and were struggling to find new resources. Thus, the Soviet Union wanted to enhance its pressure on these countries. As a result, the U.S. State Department initiated a new program for Europe to develop its devastated economy. “The remarks of secretary Marshall at Harvard on June 5, 1947, describing this urgency led to the much vaster economic aid program known as the Marshall Plan.”⁴⁹

“Proclamation of the Marshall plan in June 1947 faced the Ankara authorities with the urgent problem of discovering how they might fit into this project.”⁵⁰ The U.S. was not interested in including Turkey in the Marshall Plan because the U.S. felt that Turkey’s vital needs were already being met by the Truman Doctrine. In addition, according to U.S. officials, Turkey had the capacity to support Europe with agricultural products.⁵¹

At that time, Turkey had recently transformed into a multi-party system from a one-party system and sought political stabilization. Thus, Turkey sent a group of delegates to the U.S. in order to convince U.S. officials that Turkey would benefit from the Marshall Plan. After long negotiations, the U.S. gave ground and “agreed to extend

⁴⁷ Quoted in Akgul, *An Analysis of 1964 Johnson Letter*, 10 from William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London, Frank Cass, 2002), 110.

⁴⁸ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 11, also refers to the entire paragraph.

⁴⁹ “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vo. 401, *America and the Middle East*, 81.

⁵⁰ George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American problems in historical perspective 1945-1971* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 31.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

Turkey \$10 million in credits.”⁵² However, in order to maintain eligibility, the Turkish government had to follow up with new policies including a free market and reduced barriers for trade. Although some left-wing parties strongly criticized these new policies by accusing America of trying to seek “control of Turkey’s resources in order to be able to exploit the country as a colony, ... Turks greeted the Marshall Plan with warm appreciation.”⁵³

From 1947 to 1961, which included both the Truman and Marshall aid, “Turkey received \$1,862 million in military assistance and \$1,394 million in economic assistance from the United States.”⁵⁴ Most of this was spent on mechanization of agriculture, modernization of mining processes, constructing highways, and other sectors. Specifically, the Marshall Plan focused on the agriculture sector much more than on the other sectors. Therefore, the Turkish Government’s Democratic Party was criticized for the policies that caused “alienation”⁵⁵ between elites and peasants “which would set the stage for a military revolt”⁵⁶ in 1960.

E. NATO MEMBERSHIP

Until 1948, the U.S. rejected the establishment of military alliances, even though it was offered many times by the Turkish Government. When the Communist party became the ruling government in Czechoslovakia, and Berlin was blockaded by the Soviet Union in 1948, the U.S. decided to shift its policy. With the members of the Brussels Pact (England, France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg), the U.S. formed the Western defense system called NATO “with no provision for Turkish membership” in April 1949.⁵⁷

⁵² Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 31-32.

⁵³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 33.

⁵⁴ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 110.

⁵⁵ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 35.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Turkey was disappointed at not being included and began to feel further isolated. In order to convince the U.S. to include Turkey in NATO, many Turkish bureaucrats and government officials arranged meetings with Washington officials. None of these negotiations was successful because the U.S. was reluctant “to undertake further responsibilities until NATO’s structure had been firmly established.” Moreover, it was not only the U.S. who opposed Turkish entry, but also Western European countries. Their main point was that the enlargement of NATO to a non-industrialized and Muslim Turkey would harm the strength of European unity. In addition, they were afraid of a reduction in the aid they were receiving from the U.S.⁵⁸

On the other hand, the British government focused on retaining its hold on the Middle East as a central part of strategic policy. They wanted Turkey to join a Middle East defense system that was supervised by the British government. However, “the global situation changed radically” after the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 1950.⁵⁹

At that time, the Democratic Party was elected after the successful transformation from a single-party system to a multi-party system in Turkey. The election, which was seen as a democratic reform in Turkey, was welcomed and appreciated by Washington. “On July 25, 1950, the Menderes Government announced its decision to send a 4500-man unit to join the U.S. troops in Korea...without consulting the opposition parties or gaining parliamentary approval.” This decision was the key to NATO membership. After fighting bravely within the allied lines, Turkey won the full support and sympathy of her Western allies. Accordingly, on August 1, 1950, the “Turkish Foreign office approached the U.S., British, and French ambassadors with a request” for full membership to NATO.⁶⁰

Although initially supportive of Turkey’s membership in NATO, the U.S. policy shifted due to the strategic views of General Eisenhower, who was the Supreme Allied

⁵⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 36-38.

⁵⁹ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 117.

⁶⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 39, 40.

Commander in Europe at that time. According to Eisenhower, Europe was shaped like a “bottleneck.” The Soviets were in the wide part, central Europe in the neck, and Spain represented the end. If the Soviets had attempted to attack the “central bottleneck,” Europe would have responded by using its flanks. With this in mind, Turkey was in a vital geographic position, being located to the south of the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Also, the extension of the borders of NATO to include Turkey, “would force the Soviets to commit considerable forces away from the European Theater. In other words, there was a mutuality of benefits in the Turkish-American relationship.”⁶² As a result, Turkey was accepted as a full member of NATO in February 1952.

NATO membership had multiple effects on Turkey. Although the new foreign policy of the Turkish Republic after WWII seemed to lead Turkey into NATO, this was not the only reason. Turkish concerns regarding her economic conditions “played a considerable part [with] the idea that its exclusion might lead to a decrease of U.S. interest and subsequent reduction in American aid must have had its weight in the government’s decision.”⁶³ Also, the Democratic Party escaped a domestic “diplomatic defeat” because of its Western-based policies. In addition, NATO membership relieved Turkish concerns of American aid in the case of a Soviet attack. Moreover, it was perceived as a victory of Turkish Foreign Affairs in terms of being treated as a European Country.⁶⁴ Pro-Americanism among the Turkish public increased so much that Turks began to feel themselves and Americans “intrinsically alike” and Turkey as “Little America.”⁶⁵

⁶¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 118.

⁶² Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 12, 13.

⁶³ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 111.

⁶⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 36, 44, 45.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 45.

On the American side, the U.S. assumed that mutual interests between the two countries were completely harmonious. Therefore, an overestimation of “U.S. freedom of activity in Turkey” emerged. When the U.S. planners began to take advantage of the alliance over issues that were not related to “containing the Soviet Union,” a definition of the scope of cooperation was required.⁶⁶

Between 1950 and 1960, Turkey improved her relations with the U.S. in terms of military cooperation. Until 1957, an important number of “U.S.-cum-NATO facilities were constructed in Turkey, including, most notably, an air base at Incirlik, near Adana, with other bases at Karamursel, Cigli, and Diyarbakir, and radar stations at Karamursel, Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, Belbasi, and Diyarbakir, and [some naval facilities] at Iskenderun.”⁶⁷ In 1955, Turkey was involved in another project, the Baghdad Pact, which was initiated by the British and U.S. governments. The U.S. was not an actual member of the Baghdad Pact, but was a strong supporter and financier. Turkey, with Iran, was an essential actor in this pact, especially for the U.S., because of the Turkish border with the Soviet Union. According to Hale, although Turkey did not have a definite policy towards the Middle East, to keep from being excluded from “economic and military aid,” Turkey preferred to participate.⁶⁸ As a result, in 1957 Turkey received over \$200 million in military aid via the Eisenhower doctrine, which promised aid to Middle Eastern countries that contained Communism.⁶⁹ “Turkey, as the first Muslim country has also recognized Israel and proved to be a very significant and viable partner for the American Middle East policy determined by the Eisenhower Doctrine.”⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 36, 44, 45.

⁶⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 123.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 125.

⁶⁹ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 13.

⁷⁰ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 24.

F. TENSIONS

In 1958, the first slight divergence in mutual relations emerged. Lebanon was about to be involved in a domestic fight because of escalated tension between the Muslim and Christian populations in July 1958. Therefore, the Lebanese government called for urgent support from the U.S. Due to the urgency of the situation, the U.S. provided rapid support from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Although the Democratic Party demonstrated no objection to this, it resulted in a negative perception by the Turkish public. Instead of consulting Turkish authorities about the Lebanon operation, the U.S. only notified them. Thus, “Inonu and his associates attacked the U.S. operation as an abuse of Turkish sovereignty...” In addition, the scope of collaboration emerged as a question in their minds. Was it collaboration only when dealing with the containment of the Soviets or should it be perceived in a broader perspective related to the “coincidence of mutual interests” even if it harms Turkish interests in some way?⁷¹ The main perception on the Turkish side was that there was a prioritization of U.S. interests “over those of its ally, Turkey.”⁷²

When an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in 1960 by the USSR while flying over the Soviet Union, Turkey became more suspicious about its alliance with the U.S. The Soviet Union accused Turkey of granting permission for the “plane to use Turkish bases.”⁷³ Turkey denied the Soviet’s accusation and proved that the plane, which flew a route from Pakistan to Norway, had nothing to do with Turkish bases. As a result, Turkey wanted the U.S. to inform her regarding all these flights and “cancelled all U-2 flights from her” territory.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 67.

⁷² Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 14.

⁷³ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 12.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

In terms of military cooperation, and in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine of massive retaliation and the burden of nuclear sharing, Turkey allowed fifteen mid-range Jupiter ballistic missiles, equipped with nuclear warheads, to be placed inside Turkish national territory in October 1959. “The missiles were installed at a base near Izmir in autumn of 1961,” and became ready for operation in 1962. Due to the installation of the missiles in Turkey, Turkish politicians and elites were divided into two groups. The first group was not in favor of installing the missiles as “they might provoke an attack by the Soviet Union.” According to the second group, the missiles demonstrated the power of Turkey and the determination of the alliance to respond to the Soviet Union in case of an attack on Turkey. These Jupiter missiles were given to Turkey in terms of military aid with the exception of the nuclear warheads, which were controlled by the U.S.⁷⁵

From 1959 until the missiles were installed in Turkey, the American government questioned the benefits of the liquid fueled missiles, which “would soon be outdated by the Polaris submarine-launched system.” Moreover, they were assessed as “vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.” Therefore, the Kennedy administration, with its policy of flexible response, decided to revise the installation of the missiles in Turkish territory, but the result did not change due to strong opposition from the Turkish government. From the Turkish point of view, the missiles were related to Turkey’s the “National Security.”⁷⁶ On the other hand, according to U.S. authorities, the missiles had no substantial importance in terms of deterrence against the Soviet Union. Although the U.S. did deploy the missiles into Turkey, the main point was not Turkish opposition. The main reason was not to be seen as weak “after Khrushchev’s diplomatic defense at the Vienna Summit” in 1961. Deployment of the missiles demonstrated another divergence of interests between two countries.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 133,134.

⁷⁶ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 16.

⁷⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 134.

On October 26, 1962, President Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev offering a trade, which was to withdraw the missiles in Cuba in return “for an American agreement to lift the Quarantine and a pledge not to invade the island.”⁷⁸ The next morning, a second letter from Khrushchev arrived. This time his offer was revised and the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba was attached to the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. In order not to “provoke further demands from Khrushchev” and disappoint Turkish interests “to appease an enemy,” President Kennedy simply ignored the second letter and responded to the first one “accepting the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles without a trade.” The crisis was over.⁷⁹ Although it seems that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were excluded as part of the trade by the U.S., that was not the case. According to the memoirs of Senator Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy’s brother, the U.S. pledged to withdraw the Jupiter missiles, after a short while, in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. As a result, the Jupiter missiles were removed in 1963.⁸⁰

The Cuban Missile Crisis left deep marks on Turkish foreign policy makers. First of all, it was clear that the U.S. might act independently without consulting its allies when its interests were at stake. Secondly, Turkey, “in its dealings with both the United States and the Soviet Union, needed to be more cautious than it had been in 1959–62”⁸¹ because “a decision by Washington might jeopardize her safety even her existence.”⁸² Consequently, Turkey decided to revise her Washington-dependent foreign policy in favor of a multilateral foreign policy. Turkey initiated improving relations with the Soviet Union, which had been neglected since 1932.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 128.

⁷⁹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 135.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 136.

⁸² Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 129.

⁸³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 136.

G. A REVIEW

In summary, from the end of the WWII to the end of 1963, Turkey and the U.S. improved relations on the basis of a common enemy, the Soviet Union. They both benefited from this alliance, but in fact, their foreign policies were not totally convergent because of their different geographical positions and global perspectives.⁸⁴ Due to strong Soviet pressures, Turkey, thinking emotionally rather than rationally on a long-term basis, attached her interests to the U.S. with “blind loyalty.”⁸⁵ However, in the end, Turkey realized that her national interests “and the U.S.” would not always be identical.⁸⁶

Turkish-American relations during the Ataturk period were not developed with a strategic concept. The main reason might be Turkey’s urgent domestic issues after the War of Independence. At that time, Turkey had to focus on domestic rather than international issues. In addition, the U.S. was unwilling to form strong relations with Turkey. Since Turkey’s southern borders were still problematic, especially Mosul and Syria, the U.S. refrained from initiating diplomatic relations with Turkey. The U.S. demanded that Turkey resolve its border problems with Britain and France first. British officials offered an appealing share of Mosul oil to the U.S., thus, the U.S. government at that time did not back Turkey. Yet Turkey was pursuing a trustworthy ally as it realized that it was alone in the international arena.

Turkey’s desires, in terms of finding an ally, were fulfilled when the Soviets emerged as a threat after WWII. Until the 1960s, Turkish-American relations were shaped around the same threat, “Communism.” In this context, Turkey’s gains were the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO membership. Turkey not only enhanced the capacity of its army, but also improved its roads and infrastructure by means of the military aid provided by the U.S. Thus, besides the Communism factor as the initiator of

⁸⁴ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 19.

⁸⁵ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 128.

⁸⁶ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 19.

relations, Turkey avoided differentiating its interests from the U.S. in order to keep an economic source. In addition, this economic contribution by the U.S. consolidated the position of the government in Turkey. From the American side, Turkey was a trusted ally with a minimum cost to contain the Soviet Union. By securing all of the Middle East via Turkey, the U.S. was hitting many birds with just one stone.

Despite collaboration between Turkey and the U.S., there were definite points of conflicts as well. To begin with, the U.S. was a global power, but Turkey was a regional one. Therefore, American and Turkish views and interpretations of events differed strongly in some periods and cases. Lebanon, U-2 and the Cuban Crisis were the clearest examples of this kind. Although both countries shared the same threat, “Communism,” the priorities of both sides might vary according to other factors. When Turkey felt itself strongly threatened by Communism, secondary concerns were not considered, but when the threat faded a bit, Turkish priorities changed. Related to this, Turkey and U.S. goals were not aligned. Turkey’s main motivation was to improve its economic and diplomatic conditions by means of good relations with the U.S. However, the U.S., as a global power, was in favor of securing the region, and sometimes urged it to act unilaterally at the expense of its other ally, Turkey. Turkish citizens were sensitive to their national sovereignty. All three cases mentioned above, were interpreted as an abuse of national sovereignty, which in return provoked the Turkish public to turn against the U.S. According to the Turkish people, America might act unilaterally in some cases at the expense of others when its own interests were at stake. In my opinion, at this point, the emotional structure of Turkish citizens might have played an important role, acting as a hindrance in the relations. Yet, these events were exaggerated by the opposition press to instigate the public, whose aim was to make the government appear to be a satellite of the U.S. This opposition group consisted of the far-leftists, who judged the U.S. to be an imperialistic power, but in fact were only a small part of the Turkish elite. Thus, domestic pressure sometimes restricted the Turkish government from cooperating further with the U.S. Overall, Turkish-American relations started with the “Communism” threat, stiffened by the efforts of the Turkish government’s efforts to correspond its interests with the U.S.’, but decreased due to different global, geographical and domestic concerns.

Turkey and the U.S.' main collaborations were based on "the context of a western defense system."⁸⁷ Turkey, as the southern flank of NATO, was a trusted ally for containment of Soviet expansion to the Middle East. For Turkey, there was no choice but to protect herself "from the Soviet Aggression." Thus, the "Turkish-American friendship...began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s..."⁸⁸ Despite a few cases from 1945 to 1963, the tension between the U.S. and Turkey had escalated, but relations were maintained at a high-level without any significant conflict. In this light, it can be interpreted that the relations were pre-destined to improve despite some deteriorations, due to the essential common interests. The main turning point in the mutual relations emerged with the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, due to contrasting approaches.

⁸⁷ Ilter Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilaterism," *The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies*, 2.

⁸⁸ Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 115.

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III. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR (1964-1980)

Turkish-American relations became more of a patron-client relationship in the period between 1945 and 1964. However, after President Johnson's letter of 1964, the relationship changed into more of a “small state—big state relationship,”⁸⁹ in terms of Turkish attempts to act unilaterally regarding the asymmetry of these diplomatic relations. This period witnessed asymmetric interests related to the conflict of global power versus regional power. When Turkish officials noticed that it was impossible to converge all national and security interests as a small state with the U.S. as a super power, they called for some unilateral acts. Yet these acts were still dependent, to some degree, on the U.S., if not at the beginning in the 1950s, then at least at the end in the 1970s. As a result of these conflicts over the divergent strategic interests, the relationship had ups and downs, especially downs during this period. However, through the end of the 1970s, as the author argues, relations were on the way to improving, as both countries shared the same core strategic interests. At the end of the 1970s, common strategic interest again appeared as the protection against “Communism.” Thus, as usual, the zigzagging relations were put back on track.

The essential problems of this period were: 1) Cyprus and 2) opium. To begin with, it is useful to take a deeper look into the fate of the island Cyprus in the mid twentieth century.

A. CYPRUS⁹⁰

Cyprus is a Mediterranean island located 65 km. south of Turkey and 800 km. from Greece. Since the island is in a very critical geographic position in the southern part

⁸⁹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 216.

⁹⁰ The author grants the island the name Cyprus in this thesis. In order to prevent confusion in academic literature, the word “Cyprus” is used to describe the island. However, Cyprus is composed of two independent nations: the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus and the Greek Republic of South Cyprus. Hence, since 1986, Cyprus refers to both countries.

of Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkish officials were always concerned about the situation on the island for national security reasons. The main reason for the conflict between the two communities on the island was founded on “the Greek Cypriot struggle for ‘enosis’ — the union of Cyprus with Greece, and Turkish Cypriot attempts to prevent it.” The island had been under British rule earlier in the twentieth century.⁹¹ Turkish concerns on the island may be summed up by three main points: first, the danger of a unified Cyprus with Greece, which would restrict Turkish freedom in the Mediterranean; the Turkish Community on the island that needs Turkish support against the Greek majority; and lastly, the perception of enosis by Turks as “a first step for achieving the *Megali Idea* (re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire).”⁹² On the other hand, the U.S., as a global power, had different concerns regarding the island. The United States was more focused on preventing the Soviets from seizing power in Cyprus, which could be used as a natural station for naval and air elements in the Mediterranean. Also, the island’s geographic position would enable any power to gain superiority in the Mediterranean.

Cyprus became an Ottoman Empire territory in 1571. Beginning in 1878, the UK began an unofficial invasion and then seized control of the entire island in 1914. “A Greek nationalist movement going back to the 1930s, to unite the island with Greece, gained new momentum in the 1950s as UK and French colonial rule were crumbling in North Africa and the Middle East, and challenged British rule, as Britain had already begun to withdraw from its other colonies.”⁹³ Due to the escalated tension on the island between the two communities in the late 1950s (Greek guerillas had interfered with UK operations at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956), negotiations among Britain, Turkey and Greece took place without any success until 1959. The Republic of Cyprus was founded in August 1960 according to the agreements in the London-Zurich Treaty of 1959.

⁹¹ Turgut Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964 Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish American Relations, and Global Power regional partner Interactions* (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 20.

⁹² Mustafa Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36, no. 1, (January 2000): 120.

⁹³ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 3.

Although the U.S. had no interest in Cyprus “either historically or geopolitically” until 1945, the “strategic interests in the southern flank of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and tensions in the Middle East”⁹⁴ after the 1950s increased U.S. concerns on the island. In 1958, the U.S. sent troops to Lebanon to foreclose a Syrian Baathist Putsch there. Nevertheless, the U.S. was reluctant to be involved in the problem since it might alienate one of her two NATO allies, either Greece or Turkey. On the other hand, despite not being involved in the London-Zurich agreement, the U.S. wanted to keep an eye on the Cyprus problem, hoping for a peaceful solution between the two NATO allies.

One of the most important results of the London-Zurich agreement was the *Treaty of Guarantee* that “allowed the three outside powers, [Britain, Turkey, and Greece], to consult and, if necessary, act jointly in the event of any breach of the agreements.” Moreover, if no consensus on a joint action could be established, any of the outside powers had the right to act unilaterally. Turkey founded her legacy of threat to intervene on the island on the basis of this agreement.⁹⁵

The difference in perception of the new status of the island was very clear among American and Turkish officials. Despite “American expectations that Zurich-London agreement did...bring the Cyprus problem to...an end,”⁹⁶ after the agreement, Ismet Inonu, the Turkish Prime Minister, underlined the difficulty of implementing the constitution unless “both communities are...convinced that enosis is not possible in the long run.”⁹⁷

B. TOWARDS INTERVENTION

As violence escalated between the two communities on the island, the U.S., to prevent the island from “exploitation by the local Communists,”⁹⁸ looked for new

⁹⁴ T. W. Adams, “The American Concern in Cyprus,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 401, America and the Middle East, (May 1972): 96.

⁹⁵ Adams, “The American Concern in Cyprus,” 97.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 98.

⁹⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 148.

⁹⁸ Adams, “The American Concern in Cyprus,” 98.

solutions. The events began in November 1963 when Makarios, the president of Cyprus, proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution that would pave the way for enosis and endanger the rights of the Turkish community on the island. Around Christmas of 1963, Greek attacks on the Turkish Community intensified. When tension became too high, on December 23, 1963, the U.S. took its first active step by warning both sides (Greece and Turkey) not to use the “Military Assistance Program equipment” without consulting the U.S.⁹⁹ The next day, the U.S. wanted both the Turkish and Greek sides to calm the tension as the “leadership of both communities”¹⁰⁰ was looking for ways to stop the violence.

Turkish Prime Minister Inonu was not satisfied by the U.S. response to the crisis. According to Inonu, the only solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved by the involvement of the U.S. Contrary to his view, “the United States was restraining itself from imposing any solution on the Cyprus dispute for the fear of alienating either Greece or Turkey.”¹⁰¹

As mentioned above, the United States’ main policy on Cyprus from 1950 to 1963 was non-intervention. Firstly, it was perceived as a problem between the British and the Cypriots, which it surely was, as a British protectorate. Consequently, the U.S. did not want the issue to be discussed in the UN, which in return would give the Soviet Union the right to intervene. Secondly, the special relations between Great Britain and the United States “prevented the U.S. from taking a position against Britain.” Washington was being careful as the British had strategic concerns on the island, which was a natural base, similar to the colonial countries of Great Britain. The UK today still owns two bases, Agratur and Dikelya, which were allocated to the UK according to the London-Zurich Agreement. These bases are of great value to the UK since they serve Britain’s strategic

⁹⁹ Suha Bolukbasi, “The Johnson Letter Revisited,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, July 1, 1993, 512.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 120.

interests in the Mediterranean. The United States was ready to accept any solution regarding the island that would not harm its interests, but refused to be part of the discussion.¹⁰²

The United States' perspective towards Cyprus was based on the terms of the Cold War, so NATO's integrity and the containment of the Soviet Union were the priorities of the U.S. The American government always supported a solution by negotiations among the outside powers in order to prevent a split in NATO. Since a conflict among the NATO members would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit, the U.S. avoided bringing the issue into the United Nations. Moreover, "Archbishop Makarios" [the president of Cyprus] flirtations with Moscow...could bring the intrusion of the Soviet Union into the Strategic Eastern Mediterranean."¹⁰³ Also, the United States did not intend to support one side at the expense of the other so as not to damage NATO's solidarity. Americans were so focused on the Cold War perspective that they ignored "the bilateral aspect of the dispute among the conflicting parties."¹⁰⁴ The possibility that the island could fall under Communism was the only motivation of the U.S. government, to the extent that it neglected domestic conflicts on the island. To sum up, the U.S. concerns were: a) prevent a war between two NATO allies, b) maintain special relations with the UK since Cyprus was still a member of the British Commonwealth, c) keep the integrity of NATO, d) contain the Soviet influence on the island since the Communist party, AKEL (The Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus), was potentially powerful, and e) tie the island to the West.¹⁰⁵

From the Turkish point of view, the priority was to impede a historical enemy (Greece) from seizing power on the island. Secondly, the Turkish government was concerned about the future of the Turkish community on the island. Lastly, Turkey did

¹⁰² Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 26.

¹⁰³ Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus," 102.

¹⁰⁴ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 28.

¹⁰⁵ Adams, "The American Concern in Cyprus," 101, 102.

not intend to harm her relations with her Western Allies since Greece had threatened to withdraw from NATO in case there was a Turkish military intervention. Aside from all these concerns, since Turkey had turned its face to the West because of ‘Communism,’ it would be fair to say that Turkey was concerned, as much as the United States was, of a Communist threat on the island. However, this was not the primary Turkish goal.

Thinking in terms of a Communist threat, Turkish and American strategic views were convergent in every way. “Yet, the difference in the Turkish approach was that Turkey did not consider Greece as a friendly country, even though it was a member of NATO.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, the perspectives of both countries differentiated at a very critical point. The Turkish point of view was regional in contrast to the global concerns of the U.S.

This different approach took place as a constitutional crisis in December 1963. The U.S. supported the amendments to avert taking the problem to the UN. Turkey, who regarded the amendments as the first step towards *enosis*, strictly opposed it. From December 1963 until President Johnson’s letter in June 1964, Turkey proposed a military intervention on the island several times. All of these proposals were rejected by the American government because of the American concerns mentioned above. However, these proposals forced the U.S. to be involved in the Cyprus dispute with major implications. In fact, this was the primary intention of the Inonu government, who thought that only the U.S. could get the Greeks in line.

Despite attempts to intervene militarily on the island several times, Inonu’s main intention was to involve the U.S. in the Cyprus dispute more actively. Since Turkey was suffering from inadequate military equipment and international support for such an operation, the U.S., as a strong ally, was the only way to benefit in such a dispute. Nevertheless, Turkey’s intervention bluffs set the stage for the involvement of the U.S. Every threat accelerated the resolution process in terms of NATO and UN peacekeeping missions or other diplomatic efforts. However, all these efforts were too far away to establish peace on the island.

¹⁰⁶ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 36.

C. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER

When “the presence of United Nations forces seemed insufficient to quell disturbances, the American Ambassador was given warning of the impending military operation, and this elicited the letter by President Johnson [on June 5, 1964].”¹⁰⁷ In his letter, the President mentioned that

NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies...I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.¹⁰⁸

As a result, Turkey cancelled its intervention plans. In his response to President Johnson, Inonu mentioned that Greece, “who repudiates Treaties signed by herself,”¹⁰⁹ should be the side to be warned, instead of Turkey. Furthermore, he said that

If NATO members should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation of a fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not, and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning.¹¹⁰

President Johnson’s letter, which “became an issue in Turkish domestic politics [after being] revealed in January, 1966,”¹¹¹ caused a deep shock among the Turkish public. According to the people, Americans left Turkey alone at the expense of the Greeks. Inonu interpreted the new situation as an alliance of enemies and friends against Turkey. In addition, the Turkish press “referred to the letter as a ‘betrayal’ of Turkey, as a

¹⁰⁷ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 130.

¹⁰⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, 115.

¹⁰⁹ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 131.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Roderic H. Davison, *The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective: Turkey* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), 160.

‘blow to national dignity,’ or as having ‘broken the Turkish nation’s heart.’”¹¹² Johnson’s tone in this letter was so harsh that it affected Turkish emotions intensely. Moreover, “in any event, the questioning of NATO support if the Cyprus dispute should lead to a Soviet attack against Turkey was undoubtedly a major error.”¹¹³ In this context, a great mistrust towards American and NATO commitments emerged in Turkey. As a result of these events related to the Cyprus dispute, Turkish policy makers recognized “that their strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changing international system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the World Community.”¹¹⁴ According to the Turkish policy makers, it was the end of the Turkish-American honeymoon, which seemed far too gone to ever be revived.

It is essential to mention here that President Johnson criticized Turkey instead of Greece due to certain national interests. Cyprus is an important island as whoever controls it has a distinct advantage in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa, in terms of strategy and operations. If a war between Turkey and Greece arose due to Turkish intervention, it would not only weaken the southern flank of NATO, but also push the Makarios regime towards the Soviet camp, who had already “appealed to the Soviet Union for support on the Cyprus question.” Therefore, instead of the non-aligned situation of Cyprus, a unified Cyprus with Greece, which would pull Cyprus to the NATO side, would be welcomed by Washington, as opposed to a Cyprus intervention that would bring the Soviet Union into a vulnerable southern flank.

Inonu, in his letter to President Johnson, said that in case of a military intervention in Cyprus, Turkey should not be the side to be reprimanded. Since Cyprus was not a member of NATO, and Turkey would legitimize its military action in the context of a Treaty of Guarantee, if Greece declared war on Turkey then it would be the Greeks who would weaken NATO’s integrity. Thus, the Turkish prime minister believed that this

¹¹² Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 132. Quoted in Turkish newspapers *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1968, and *Aksam*, September 21, 1967.

¹¹³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 115.

¹¹⁴ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 119.

letter should be written to Greece instead of Turkey. But, the Turkish government was mistaken thinking that the U.S. would apply more restrictions to Greece instead of Turkey because of “the changed circumstances in...international relations... [by] 1960s.”¹¹⁵ At that time, Greece was less dependent on the U.S. economically than Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish officials were much more willing to harmonize reciprocal interests with the U.S. Additionally, the Turkish view according to which “the relative importance of Turkey to the United States was more than that of Greece,”¹¹⁶ paved the way for diplomatic failure.

To summarize the confrontations in the Cyprus dispute between the two countries:

- The dynamics of the relations were totally separate. Since the United States was a global actor, it interpreted the situation through global concerns. Although Turkey shared her concerns regarding the Soviet threat, this was not a Turkish priority. Turkey, as a regional power, was much more involved in the regional dimension of the dispute, which was vis-à-vis the Greek threat. In this context, the Cold War dimension of the dispute was sharply divided. Moreover, Turkey had expected the U.S., as a leader of freedom, to find a resolution to prevent humanitarian crimes on the island. Yet, this was a sub-concern of the U.S. related to the Cold War.¹¹⁷
- The two countries shared “unaligned goals.” The U.S.’ main goal was to maintain NATO’s integrity and “prevent this issue from being continuously exploited by the Soviets.” Turkey’s fear was Greek expansion towards her southern border.¹¹⁸
- Domestic factors were also involved. The Turkish government was, at that time, so vulnerable that in order to pacify domestic tension, it needed to follow a strict policy towards Cyprus. The protests, due to the mass

¹¹⁵ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 120.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 121.

¹¹⁷ Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 93, 94.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 95.

killings on the island, pushed the government to make compromises. On the other side, the U.S. was sympathetic to Greek-American citizens because of its upcoming elections.¹¹⁹

D. TURKEY'S REACTION TO JOHNSON'S LETTER

After Johnson's letter, anti-Americanism increased significantly in Turkey. Protests, including people shouting "Yankee Go Home" and throwing rocks towards the Embassy building in Ankara, blew up among the students. Consequently, "a group of journalists...charged the United States with attempting to intervene in Turkish domestic affairs to find a prime minister compliant with its wishes...CIA [was accused of] taking an opinion poll" about this issue.¹²⁰ The United States was so worried about the consequences of these strong protests that it prohibited its military personnel in Turkey "from wearing military uniforms in the public environment."¹²¹

Since Turkish officials blamed the United States for betraying Turkish loyalty in the Cyprus dispute, Turkey decided to rearrange its foreign policy in terms of a multi-lateral approach after the Cyprus Crisis. Its first result was "rapprochement with the Soviet Union... [which] was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis." The main thrusts in this policy change included a decrease of American aid, and rising anti-Americanism in the country.¹²² In fact, Turkey had begun to prioritize her national interests over the Americans' who until then "followed the American initiatives automatically."¹²³ According to the Turkish policy makers, it was time to get rid of the image that Turkey was a satellite of the United States.

¹¹⁹Akgul, *An Analysis of the 1964, Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations, and Global Power-Regional Partner Interactions*, 96, 97.

¹²⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971*, 118, 119, 120.

¹²¹ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 15.

¹²² Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 124.

¹²³ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 133.

Opposition from the leftists was also considerable after President Johnson's letter. Some leftist press organizations and student groups raised their voices and blamed the U.S. for "meddling in Turkish domestic politics." They also renewed their allegations, regarding the Westernization process of Turkey, as the branch of Western Imperialism that would eventually terminate the independence of the Turkish Republic. In this light, leftists pushed for a break-up both from NATO and the U.S.¹²⁴ According to the rightists, these ideas were so extremely Communist that their real intention was to gain more votes, rather than actually implementing what they were pushing for.

President Johnson's letter was the main factor that woke up Turkish officials to follow a more credible foreign policy. Since it became clear that Turkish and American interests were not symmetrical, but asymmetrical, Turkey shifted its policy into a multi-lateral dimension. In order to achieve national interests, Turkey realized that instead of the one-sided, sharpened policies of the cold war, it should follow multi-dimensional, softened policies. The gradually increasing number of international players also had certain effects on this shift of Turkish foreign policy.

On the other hand, Turkey, from 1964 to 1967, supported impartiality in Middle East conflicts. Turkey preferred to stay neutral in order to avoid pushing itself into a conflict with either the United States, the Soviets or the Arabs. Experiencing the lessons learned in the Cyprus Crisis, Turkey "voted for the Yugoslav resolution calling for the Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories" after the 1967 Arab-Israel War. "Potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as the future Communist bloc support for its position on Cyprus" were vital motivations for the new Turkish policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²⁵ In addition, anti-Americanism played a great role in this new policy as was written by a Turkish commentator:

The Arab-Israeli clash was the last development to have a big influence on our foreign policy although it did not directly concern the U.S....Those who infer passivity from the principle 'Peace at home, peace in the world'

¹²⁴ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 119, 129.

¹²⁵ Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 126.

may question the wisdom of supporting the Arabs, that is, the Eastern bloc and the non-aligned countries. But, even they should admit that our foreign policy needed a shake-up. Turkey had to save herself from the ‘satellite’ complex, which was felt by the public.¹²⁶

Yet, Turkey maintained her cautious approach to the Middle East conflict in order to prevent complete alienation with the Western allies, by rejecting the “Soviet resolution that labeled Israel an aggressor.”¹²⁷

Due to the sense of isolation related to the Cyprus dispute, Turkey began to question whether it would remain a member of NATO in 1966. General opinion was that the United States would support Turkey against a Russian attack. But, the likelihood of becoming weak, due to a shortage of military equipment if it withdrew from NATO, kept Turkey back. “Moreover, withdrawal from the alliance would seriously weaken Turkey in its conflict with Greece over Cyprus, since the United States might well increase military aid to Greece at Turkey’s expense.”¹²⁸

When Greek attacks on the Turkish community intensified, Turkey renewed its threat of military intervention on Cyprus in November 1967. “It was averted only by American and United Nations mediation that led Athens to promise withdrawal of many illegal Greek troops on the island...”¹²⁹ This time Turkey was more satisfied by American efforts that “had persuaded the Greek mainland government to accept the most important Turkish demands, and thus helped to restore the standing of the United States in the eyes of Turkish opinion.”¹³⁰

Another consequence of anti-Americanism that gained momentum after President Johnson’s letter, was the revision of the “bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement”

¹²⁶ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 133, quoted in Ecevit Guresin in *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1967.

¹²⁷ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 126.

¹²⁸ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 152.

¹²⁹ Davison, *The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective: Turkey*, 160.

¹³⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 153.

in 1969.¹³¹ By 1964, Turkey and the United States had signed fifty-five agreements concerning the situation of the United States' soldiers on Turkish territory. These agreements were not submitted for the approval of the Turkish National Assembly. Following the Cyprus Crisis in 1964, “the opposition parties demanded publication, cancellation or revision of the bilateral agreements, which they submitted, violated Turkish sovereignty, reintroduced the ill-famed capitulatory system of Ottoman days, or was inconsistent with the constitution.”¹³² The opposition left party claimed that a significant portion of Turkey was occupied by the United States.¹³³ Furthermore, it was alleged that Turkey had no control of American facilities inside Turkish territory. Therefore, Turkish armed forces requested expansion of their authority over these facilities. In this context, “[Turkish authorities] sought essentially a thoroughgoing reaffirmation of Turkish sovereignty and control over every facet of military cooperation with the United States...the Ankara authorities wished the agreement to state specifically that all joint defense cooperation would take place pursuant to the NATO Pact and within the limits of NATO commitments.”¹³⁴

According to American officials, Turkish attitudes towards these American facilities were more sensitive than those of other NATO allies. Americans shared the same ideas as the Turks as far as pursuing NATO commitments, yet Washington wanted “to preserve rights to import supplies necessary for the morale of its troops and to operate certain services—such as the armed forces radio stations—which were sometimes heavily criticized in the Turkish Press.”¹³⁵

On June 3, 1969, the revised Defense and Cooperation agreement became effective. In this agreement, Turkey re-emphasized its full-authority over American bases in Turkey and restricted all American military activities without consultation. In fact, all

¹³¹ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 25.

¹³² Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 139.

¹³³ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 160.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 160, 161.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

these efforts were “to base American-Turkish relations concerning defense on a mutual respect for the sovereignty and equal rights of the two parties.”¹³⁶

It is important to mention that among these concerns regarding the restriction of American activities in terms of the Defense and Cooperation Agreement, “the six-day Arab-Israel War in June 1967 touched off a new paroxysm of concern lest the Americans mount military intervention in that conflict from bases in Turkey.” Since the Turkish government was under great domestic pressure, it could hardly approve such an action.¹³⁷

E. TURKISH SOLDIERS ON THE ISLAND

From 1967 to 1974, Turkish and Greek officials worked on a solution for Cyprus in which Athens offered *Enosis* “with some compensation to the Turks in order not to harm its ties with the Western alliances.” However, Makarios was not willing to give any concessions to the Turks. Furthermore, he was following up a “non-aligned policy and good relations with the eastern bloc” in contrast to the Greek interests. Thus, friction between Greece and Makarios increased until 1974.¹³⁸ In the beginning of July 1974, Makarios enforced some counter-measures against the Greek population in Cyprus. Consequently, he demanded that Athens withdraw the Greek elements including Greek officers. Greece decided to intervene on the island by means of its own army located on the island. Thus, encouraged by Athens, Greek officers and EOKA-B, a terrorist organization on the island, executed a military coup on the Makarios government.¹³⁹

On 15 July 1974, events in Cyprus went from bad to worse, when President Makarios was replaced by the junta government of Greece. Nikos Sampson, the new president of Cyprus, “was the worst possible choice from every viewpoint, since he had virtually no support in Cyprus, and was notorious for his killings in EOKA’s campaign

¹³⁶ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 140.

¹³⁷ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 166.

¹³⁸ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 197.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 200.

against the British in the 1950s, and his hatred of the Turks.”¹⁴⁰ The island became a scene of humanitarian crimes in 1974, which were filmed by Greek journalist Antonis Angastiniyotis. Mr. Angastiniyotis did a study of the history of Cyprus and found out that 126 Turkish Cypriots living in Murataga, Sandallar and Atlilar villages, including women and children had been executed by the Greeks. Furthermore, the bodies of these people were thrown into a hole. Mr. Angastiniyotis’ Greek citizenship was revoked after his film by his own government.¹⁴¹

Since these attempts were interpreted as a “kind of de facto enosis”¹⁴² by the Turkish government, Bulet Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, immediately flew to London to discuss a joint operation with the guarantee powers; Turkey, Greece and Britain. In London, Ecevit also held a meeting with Joseph Sisco, the U.S. undersecretary of state, who guaranteed to maintain American aid “despite Turkey’s military preparations.”¹⁴³

From the Greek junta’s point of view, the timing of the coup was perfect because Turkish-American relations were teetering due to the opium problem, so any Turkish attempt to intervene militarily would inevitably be restricted by the American government. On the other hand, the American administration “was embroiled in the final stages of the Watergate Scandal, while...Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was preoccupied with the Middle East peacemaking, following the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973.”¹⁴⁴ Therefore, in the beginning of the crisis, the U.S. was too far away to focus on Cyprus effectively.

As a result, Kissinger neither put any efforts into overturning the coup in Cyprus, nor attempted to halt Turkish military intervention. “In fact, the Americans seemed to be

¹⁴⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 155.

¹⁴¹ Omer Bilge, “Turkleri Kestik Dedi, Afaroz Ettiler,” *hurriyet*, November 1, 2004, also referred to the document “Barbarism to the Turkish Cypriots and the Other Side of the Medallion” by Antonis Angastiniyotis.

¹⁴² Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, (NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers 1999), 173.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 178.

¹⁴⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 155.

doing everything they could to help the Turks make up their mind that intervention was the only way they could get satisfaction.”¹⁴⁵ America’s main concerns on the island were their intelligence and military facilities. On the other hand, they did not want the Greek junta to cause a war between Turkey and Greece, which would weaken the southern flank of NATO. In this context, the question was: why did the U.S. “pull its punches with the Turks,”¹⁴⁶ in contrast to the 1964 and 1967 crises. Firstly, according to the American administration, this time Turkish intervention was inevitable. There was no way to prevent it. Yet they believed that a war between Greece and Turkey might be averted by containing the Greeks. Furthermore, the Greek army was too weak to prevent a Turkish intervention in Cyprus.¹⁴⁷

From Ankara’s point of view, the intervention was inevitable for good reasons. First of all, Turkey was opposed to having an enemy on its southern border due to security concerns. A Cyprus unified with Greece meant an extension of Greek borders, and Greece, which was at the south door of Turkey, was not friendly to Turkey at that time. Secondly, the London-Zurich agreement would be violated, which meant the denial of an international agreement and would be a detriment to the prestige of the Turkish Republic. Thirdly, although there were two communities on the island, one of them, the Turkish Cypriots, would be subject to the rule of the Greek Cypriots. This situation was unacceptable, not only to the Turkish government but also to the Turkish people who had already had an independence war with Greece and were very sensitive to their national feelings. Lastly, the fragile balance of power “in the Mediterranean and Aegean region, which was established by Lausanne Treaty,”¹⁴⁸ would be violated, to the detriment of Turkey, due to the island’s strategic location.

In contrast to Turkish views, the Athens Junta supported *Enosis* as that was their traditional and Hellenic goal. The junta “would prefer a Cyprus (or part of it) united and

¹⁴⁵ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 178.

¹⁴⁶ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 186.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 198.

docile to Greece...to a Cyprus functioning as an independent sister country of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean whose interests, not only its ties of blood, would keep it closer to Greece than to any country in the area. This has come about because of the junta's incautiously nationalistic approach, and because of its concerns to serve American interests in the belief that it thus furthers its own cause."¹⁴⁹ American and Greek junta relations were maintained at a satisfactory level until the military coup in Cyprus in 1974. Until that time, the U.S. supported a Cyprus unified with Greece as it avoided a Soviet intervention related to the involvement of Cyprus in NATO. Thus, Turkey was reluctant to act unilaterally on the island in case there was a second disappointment after President Johnson's letter.

However, after the coup took place in Cyprus, Washington implemented a "wait-and-see policy." Washington did not want a war between Turkey and Greece due to the coup in Cyprus, but refrained to apply any pressure on Athens since alienation with Athens might have jeopardized American bases and "strategic interests in Greece."¹⁵⁰ When Kissinger realized that Turkey would intervene anyway, he was glad because the problem would be solved without any direct involvement of the U.S. that might have resulted in alienation of either side. Furthermore, being an ally of the U.S., Turkish intervention would not harm U.S. interests on the island and would prevent any Soviet intervention there.

With some encouragement by the American administration, Turkey launched its military operation on 20 July 1974. Turkish armed forces proceeded for two days until they secured a beachhead. In fact, Turkish intervention was organized in two stages, which resulted in what would be limited "to a triangular area between Kyrenia on the north coast, the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia and Lefka in the north-west."¹⁵¹ To

¹⁴⁹ Stephen G. Xydis, "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy," in Clogg and Yannopoulos, *Greece Under Military Rule*, (NY: Basic Books Inc., 1972), 204.

¹⁵⁰ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 202, 203.

¹⁵¹ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 194.

be frank, this plan was nearly the same as the U.S. contingency plan that had been offered in 1964. “It was as if the secret U.S. plans of 1964 had been played out in Turkey’s favor.”¹⁵²

On July 23, a ceasefire was established and the Geneva negotiations began on July 25. According to the U.S. Congress, Turkish troops were moving forward despite the ceasefire. After ceasing to blame the Turks for their actions, Kissinger explained why he supported Turkey at the expense of Greece. According to Kissinger,

Turkey’s value to American security interests [was] higher than that of the Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, Government. Turkey housed vital bases and sophisticated electronic listening-posts along the Soviet border, installations which made possible, for example, intelligence on Russian military moves of the kind that spurred the October nuclear alert during the Yom Kippur War the year before, and monitoring of Soviet missile activity.¹⁵³

During the negotiations in Geneva, Turkey accepted the American proposal offering a cantonal system on the island, which was rejected by the Greeks. Thus, Turkey decided to proceed to the second phase of the military operation. Turkish officials thought that this second operation would force the Greeks to reconciliation at the table, but this was not accomplished. Consequently, the Turkish government resigned and Turkish politics became unstable.

F. AFTERMATH OF CYPRUS INTERVENTION

After the second operation, opposition voices in Congress began to strongly criticize Turkish actions and President Ford’s ignorance on the matter. On February 5, 1975, Congress approved a new resolution that banned all “military sales and aid to Turkey until the president could show that substantial progress had been registered towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem.”¹⁵⁴ The reason for the embargo was the equipment used by the Turkish troops in the military operations. Since this equipment

¹⁵² O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 186.

¹⁵³ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 200.

¹⁵⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 160.

was supplied by the U.S. for military aid, it was not supposed to be used in an operation against a neutral country. According to Turkish officials, “the embargo was a grave mistake [and military aid] to Turkey was not a favor but an essential obligation.”¹⁵⁵ Despite the intense efforts of the Ford Administration to lift the ban, the ban would remain effective until 1978. According to the president, the ban would do nothing to improve the situation but might jeopardize “the system...in the Eastern Mediterranean [where it] has been based for 28 years.”¹⁵⁶

Turkish response appeared immediately, stressing a revision of the American facilities in Turkey. Defense Secretary Schlesinger, “who had earlier criticized the Turks, now testified that the loss of intelligence stations in Turkey would be a disaster.”¹⁵⁷ However, all these efforts to lift the ban failed. Consequently, Turkey declared a suspension of all the activities of the American facilities, “other than those deemed to have purely NATO function.”¹⁵⁸ Additionally, the Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969 was propped up. The official response of the Turkish Government to the American embargo was also noteworthy: “Over the last 30 years, Turkey and the United States have maintained friendly ties, have helped each other on matters of mutual security...The recent decision of the U.S. Congress, imposing an arms embargo on Turkey, is the expression of a mentality that misinterprets the basic philosophy underlying these relations and cooperation...Though the Turkish Government is pleased to note that the U.S. Governments’ views are in line with the Turkish stand concerning the attitude of Congress, a Turkish move to take account of facts and adopt counter-measures is not only proper, but inevitable...”¹⁵⁹

In October 1975, the embargo was partially lifted due to intense efforts by the Ford administration. In fact, the embargo had hampered the benefits of the U.S. rather

¹⁵⁵ R.R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, 78.

¹⁵⁶ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 226.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 226.

¹⁵⁸ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 161.

¹⁵⁹ Andrew Mango, *The Washington Papers: Turkey: A Delicately Poised All.* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications 1975), 46.

than Turkey. Consequently, the agreement on 26 March 1976 enabled the Americans to resume their activities on the bases in Turkish territory, but mandated sharing all intelligence material. That same year, the U.S. awarded Turkey a significant amount of credit.¹⁶⁰

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter “lobbied Congress to lift the embargo,”¹⁶¹ even though he had not promised to do so in his election campaign. As a result, the ban was revoked on August 1, 1978. In the end, NATO’s integrity, especially its southern flank, was successfully held, the Soviets were out of the game, and “the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean had been successfully shifted in favor of America’s most strategic important ally there.” Cyprus was the best place to keep an eye on the Soviets’ nuclear activities. Hence, the U.S. took advantage of three monitoring facilities in Northern Turkey, which had been closed during the embargo.¹⁶²

Cyprus, despite a direct connection regarding mutual relations, was related to Turkish national interests primarily, but was not a top priority as far as American interests were concerned. Yet as a global power, Washington had certain interests in the island. Turkish-American relations experienced a conflict of asymmetric relations between the two countries. What is primary to one side, did not match in terms of priority on the agenda of the other. Since one of them was a regional power, and the other a global power, the interests diverged. Although common strategic interests continued to exist, this divergence gave birth to some collateral damages such as the arms embargo.

G. OPIUM PROBLEM

From 1968 to 1974, Turkish-American relations were shaken because of the opium products grown by Turkish farmers. In 1968, Richard Nixon, the upcoming President of the U.S. in 1969, carried out his election campaign promising to solve the narcotics problem, which “was a main source of crime in the United States. [Since]

¹⁶⁰ O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 227.

¹⁶¹ Norma Salem, *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution*, 95.

¹⁶² O’Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 227, 228.

Turkey had come to be identified as one of the main sources of opium and its derivatives reaching the American markets long before Nixon's bid for presidency,"¹⁶³ the United States government began to exert harsh controls over Turkey "to prevent the illegal trafficking of opium in Turkey."¹⁶⁴ The American Congress was in favor of a resolution that would ban all opium production in Turkey. Being aware of this situation, Turkish officials increased controls over the production and transportation of opium in the country. While there were thirty provinces in which opium was grown in 1961, it was decreased to four provinces by 1971.¹⁶⁵

According to the Americans, every year the number of people addicted to heroin was going higher and higher. John E. Ingersoll, the director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, explained it in 1970 as

Ten years ago we estimated there were 60,000 narcotic addicts in the United States; today we believe there are two to three times that amount.¹⁶⁶

However the main problem was the correlation between "heroin addiction and the increase of crime," that was proven by some U.S. law institutions. Moreover, this evil habit had destroyed many American families.¹⁶⁷

As the issue became a serious matter due to pressure from the public and the press, congressmen and other officials pushed for a survey regarding the sources of heroin and pointed out possible counter-measures against whoever was responsible for the illegal trafficking of heroin in the U.S. Turkey was singled out to be the provider opium to the U.S. population according to the reports of the Bureau of Narcotics and

¹⁶³ Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism," 7.

¹⁶⁴ Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 126.

¹⁶⁵ Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism," 8.

¹⁶⁶ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 222, quoted in Michael Allan Turner, *The International Politics of Narcotics*, Ph.D. Thesis, Kent State University, 1975, 106.

¹⁶⁷ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 222.

Dangerous Drugs, which indicated that “about 80 percent of the heroin illicitly introduced into the United States was derived from opium diverted from Turkish production.”¹⁶⁸

In contrast to the American officials, Turkey did not admit to being the sole country, or “even the primary source” responsible for the heroin in the States. Ankara mentioned that a ban on opium cultivation in Turkey would not end heroin addiction in the U.S. as demand would continue. Furthermore, there were other countries such as Soviet Russia, India, and so forth, which were responsible for the heroin in the States but they were not condemned.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, domestic pressures were on the scene again, and the U.S. administration had to lend an ear to domestic voices so as not to lose votes that would result in sacrificing Turkey for some time. Yet, Turkey was willing to cooperate with the U.S. in terms of a solution to the addiction problem.

Since opium “was an important source of income for some Turkish farmers,”¹⁷⁰ Turkey asked for economic aid from the United States to replace opium with another product. In this context, the United States lent Turkey three million dollars in 1968. After the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs declared that “eighty percent of the illicit drugs on the U.S. market came from Turkey,” Congress began to think of options such as cutting off all aid to Turkey until it banned the production of opium.¹⁷¹

In 1971, the situation deteriorated into a deadlock. From the Turkish point of view, Turkey had implemented effective controls on the production of opium and was not responsible for the illegal drug traffic in the U.S. Furthermore, American proposals, in terms of aid, were insufficient to replace opium production on which a significant number of farmers were dependent for survival in Turkey. On the other side, Americans, putting the entire blame on Turkey because of illegal trafficking in their home country, rejected

¹⁶⁸ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 192, quoted in U.S., Department of State, Press Release, no. 108, April 2, 1970, 13.

¹⁶⁹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 222-233.

¹⁷⁰ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 154.

¹⁷¹ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 8.

all options other than a total ban of opium production in Turkey. The “criticism of Turkey grew and went so far as to question Turkey’s utility to the United States.”¹⁷²

The deadlock was overcome after a military coup d'état in Turkey in 1971. On 30 June 1971, Turkey declared that it had banned opium cultivation “because of [its] humanitarian obligations.”¹⁷³ This complete ban was appreciated by the United States. On the other hand, protests and anti-American emotions reemerged in the Turkish public. The majority of critics in Turkey were focused on the unfairness of the ban according to which indeed “Turkish opium had gone to meet demands of the pharmaceutical industries and these would now turn to India as an alternative supplier.”¹⁷⁴ As a result, “Turks were outraged in August 1972 when they learned that the United States had decided to ask India to increase its opium production to meet the world-wide shortage estimated by the International Narcotics Board.”¹⁷⁵

Despite these tough controls over Turkish opium, there were no significant indicators related to the decline of the illegal drug problem in the United States. Furthermore, “it was becoming apparent that eighty percent of the illicit heroine in the U.S. had not come from Turkey after all.” As a result, the general sense among the Turkish people was that the ban had nothing to do with its purpose, but “deprivations on Turkey.” This emotion stirred up objections to lift the ban.¹⁷⁶

“Eventually, in July 1974, the succeeding civilian government under Bulent Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister at that time, revoked the ban, but implemented measures to prevent diversion into the illegal market by enforcing what was known as the ‘poppy straw process’ of harvesting.”¹⁷⁷ Congress responded very strictly to the lifting of the

¹⁷² Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 127.

¹⁷³ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 127.

¹⁷⁴ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 10, 11.

¹⁷⁵ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 127.

¹⁷⁶ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 11, 12.

¹⁷⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 154.

ban. Firstly, the United States called its ambassador to Turkey back to Washington. Then, Congress worked on numerous drafts of resolutions “asking for the imposition of embargoes.” When Congress passed a final resolution allocating power to the President to cut off “all assistance to the Government of Turkey” on August 1974, Turkish politicians were fully occupied by the Cyprus intervention.¹⁷⁸

In July and August of 1974, relations between Turkey and the United States quickly deteriorated. While dealing with the opium problem on one hand and the Cyprus intervention on the other, Turkey needed American support as much as ever. But, “Turkish government and the Turkish public were outraged at Congress’ eagerness to adopt coercive measures against a loyal ally. The Ecevit government further judged Congress’ action as an indication of insensitivity toward Turkish national interests. The fact that when the coup took place in Cyprus, the United States ambassador to Turkey had already been recalled to Washington, and Congress was discussing ways to penalize Turkey symbolically, illustrates the lack of trust between two countries.”¹⁷⁹ Eventually, the, opium problem was overshadowed by Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974. Nevertheless, the opium issue continued to be a problem until 1975. According to the declarations of the American government in the summer of 1975, Turkish efforts were interpreted as sufficient and strong. After the testimony of “the U.S. undersecretary of state Joseph Sisco and the U.S. ambassador...in the house of representatives [pointing out] that Turkey’s measures in controlling trade had proven effective,” the opium deadlock was erased from the agenda.¹⁸⁰

H. CONCLUSION

The Americans’ main interests in Cyprus were to protect the integrity of NATO and American facilities on the island, and to prevent an intervention by the Soviets. In

¹⁷⁸ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 127.

¹⁷⁹ Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War,” 127.

¹⁸⁰ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 13.

this context, Kissinger's prior choice, Turkey, might be explained as a way "to maintain Turkey's commitment to the eastern flank of NATO," who might announce its neutrality in case a "full-scale conflict with Greece" occurred. Furthermore, this might be perceived as an invitation for the Soviets to intervene. Thus, the U.S., who saw the military intervention of the Turks as inevitable, preferred to deter the Greeks instead of the Turks.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, Turkey, encouraged by the U.S. administration, acted on its own to provide a stable and secure future for Turkish Cypriots, but in the end, was faced with a strict embargo implemented by Congress, in which ethnic ties became significantly important. However, the embargo had a minor effect on Turkey because Turkey was still able to get arms from other European NATO allies, such as Italy.

In comparison with President Johnson's letter, the 1974 Cyprus Crisis had had less of an impact on the Turkish public. In contrast to 1964, student demonstrations were not significant in quantity. The reason for tranquility among the Turkish people at this time, in contrast to the protests against President Johnson's letter in 1964, was because the people understood that the Ford administration was making an effort to influence Congress on behalf of Turkey.

Yet, Turkish policy makers were still vexed by the effects of ambitious Greeks lobbying for Congress to penalize Turkey. As a result, Bülent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, declared in 1978 that the Turkish government would decrease the level of "cooperation with the United States and NATO on the grounds that the Soviet Union no longer constituted a threat to Turkish security."¹⁸² Furthermore, according to Ecevit, "smaller allies did not need to correlate all of their foreign policy actions with those of the superpowers." Turkey, while maintaining its membership to NATO and Cento (Central Treaty Organization, also known as the Baghdad Pact), would follow its own interests rather than others.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, 224.

¹⁸² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 162.

¹⁸³ Aydin, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War," 128.

To conclude, the honeymoon period during 1945–1964 between Turkey and the U.S., turned into frustration, disengagement, and anti-American sentiments in Turkey. President Johnson's letter and an intolerant approach to Turkey's specific interests in opium paved the way for Turkish alienation. Nevertheless, some of the disagreements between the two countries, which strongly affected the relations in this period, may be summed up as follows:

- National feeling is the most important element in a Turkish citizen's life. Thus, the perception of the U.S. in terms of support against a historic enemy like Russia would be described as friendly. But, when the threat disappeared, an American presence might be perceived as an "occupier" and an imperialistic power.
- There was a significant difference between U.S. officials in Turkey and the Turkish public. Furthermore, the disparity in social culture emerged as a hindrance between the two societies. Instead of expressing mutual tolerance of the reciprocal life styles, and encouraged by the deteriorated atmosphere in the relations, intolerance and antipathy spread among the public.
- Domestic politics were to occupy a significant space in the relations. The Turkish government, which was seen as the puppet of the American administration by the public, ventured certain unilateral acts in order to maintain stability as well as their position. On the other hand, American politics was dominated by Greek-Americans, which have superiority in comparison to Turkish-Americans at about a 25:1 ratio.¹⁸⁴
- Turkey became aware of the fact that due to its one-sided foreign policy, it was left alone in the international arena. Hence, Turkey decided to revise its foreign policy to the detriment of its relations with the U.S. In fact, Turkey was too busy to find its own identity in this period.
- Lastly, the Turkish Labor Party, which appeared in this period, provoked anti-Americanism among the Turkish public. Although their pro-Communist approach was not adopted by most of the Turkish population, they took advantage of press organizations to influence the public.¹⁸⁵

Turkish-American relations, by the end of 1970s, had been significantly reduced. However, global developments and increased tensions between the superpowers paved

¹⁸⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 161.

¹⁸⁵ Vali, *Bridge across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, 144, 145, 146.

the way for Turkey to re-emerge as a key country because of its geographical position. “The Iranian Revolution of February 1979 meant that Turkey was now the West’s only ally in the northern tier, and its value as a listening post and barrier to any potential Soviet advance into the Middle East was reinforced.”¹⁸⁶ The concerns of the Americans regarding the future of the region were boosted when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979. All these developments made Turkey seem to be in “an arc of crisis.”¹⁸⁷ Eventually, the tendency of Turkish-American relations to always move toward improvement might be interpreted as the final destination. With respect for this final destination, the Reagan administration declared its intention to bring the “Turkish-American relationship back to the period of fifties.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 163.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 16, quoted in Omer Karasapan, “Turkey and U.S. Strategy in the Age of Glasnost,” *Middle East Report*, no. 160 (September-October 1989): 4.

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IV. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1980-2003

This is the period that clearly proves the argument of this thesis to be true. Despite significant deterioration in terms of Turkish-American relations in the previous period, the 1980s and afterwards witnessed a real strategic partnership between Turkey and the U.S. As always, the common threat, Communism, pushed both countries onto the same page and pushed trivial matters down the agenda. This time both countries were more aware of the sensitivities of the other. In this context, until the 1990s, further military cooperation stood out as the most important element on the agenda. This military cooperation was furthered by economic cooperation since Turgut Ozal initiated the new policy of Turkey as “trade not aid.” It was the Gulf War that began to turn the relationship into a strategic partnership. The Gulf War and its aftermath, the crisis in the Balkans and Caucasus, redefined and revalued Turkey’s strategic importance to the U.S. Thus, the previous frictions, before the 1980s, were replaced by strong cooperation. However, due to the effect of “strength and size”¹⁸⁹ and the locational variations, this strategic partnership diverged on some issues. Since Turkey was a weaker and smaller ally than the U.S., Turkish reactions differed from those of the U.S. Moreover, since the U.S. is located in a remote geographical position, and Turkey is located close to the regions where the main issues on the agenda took place, there were significant differences in terms of approaches to the issues. Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, Turkey and the U.S. are two “indispensable”¹⁹⁰ allies. Even though it was in an atmosphere of real deterioration, the countries would find a way to improve their relations due to the important common interests at the top of the agenda.

In the area of cooperation during this period, military issues appeared. The U.S.–Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was renewed after pending for five years. Washington decided to modernize some aspects of the Turkish military industry. Consequently, economic relations improved and Turkey began to be

¹⁸⁹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 20.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 294.

seen as a “Little America” during Prime Minister Turgut Ozal’s time. This cooperation against Communism was expanded in the first Gulf War. Turkey was the first country to back up the UN economic sanctions. Furthermore, Turkey was eager to back up the U.S. diplomatically in international areas. Afterwards, the Balkans again witnessed further cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. Turkey participated in military campaigns against the Serbs, and then afterwards, solidified this participation by contributing to the SFOR and KFOR stabilization forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Following that, Central Asia showed up as another source of cooperation. To contain the Soviet influence over the ex-Soviet countries in the region, Turkish influence was supported by the U.S. administration by means of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In addition, the U.S. supplied financial aid to Turkey via the IMF after the economic crisis in Turkey in 2001. American efforts, in terms of the integration of Turkey into the EU, were appreciated by Turkish politicians and the public. Lastly, cooperation on terrorism after 9/11 was the keystone in terms of the strategic dimensions of the relationship.

In contrast with areas of cooperation, there were also areas of conflicts in the period. To begin with, despite of the renewal of DECA, American soldiers were not totally free as far as their actions towards the Middle East on Turkish bases. The military aid supplied to Turkey by the U.S. was another headache in this period. Then, the periodic renewals of the *alleged* Armenian Genocide caused enhanced tensions. The high volume of condemnations of Ankara, regarding the violation of human rights in Turkey, dragged relations to the edge of fragility. The divergence in terms of the approach to Iraq was the most sensitive part of the conflict. Ankara’s efforts to end the economic sanctions on Iraq, after the war, fell upon deaf ears in Washington. More importantly, Ankara was not in favor of any partition or federation in Iraq, but U.S. actions were interpreted as paving the way for partitions. Lastly, Erbakan, the head of the Welfare Party, became a problem, during this time, due to his efforts to turn Turkey to face east rather than west.

However, despite all these conflicts, cooperation was much better during this time. The fields of cooperation were more concrete, important, strategic, and permanent. In contrast, the fields of debates were abstract, tactical rather than strategic, less important, and temporary. The issue of Iraq’s reestablishment would be excluded from

the points of cooperation as there was still a problem regarding the status of the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Nevertheless, this problem could have been resolved with mutual understanding as it was not as big a problem as it had been before.

A. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL 1990

When the aggressive attitudes of the Soviet Union reemerged in the 1980s, Turkey and the U.S. continued to share the same concerns in terms of Communism, especially when Ronald Reagan came into power. The concerns of the U.S. intersected with Turkish security concerns when some American diplomats were captured and taken hostage at the American Embassy in Iran. Hence, Turkish policy makers were pushed to draw their interests in compliance with the U.S.' again. Eventually, as the first sign of an improvement in relations, the U.S.-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which the two countries "had been haggling over for five years," was signed on March 29, 1980.¹⁹¹ According to DECA, the U.S. wanted to keep the "use of twelve of its most vital bases in Turkey, including Incirlik and essential intelligence gathering stations," while returning the facilities entirely back to Turkish authority.¹⁹² After the conclusion of DECA, the cooperation between Turkish and American companies improved. This cooperation yielded a common project, FNSS, which "is a Turkish based joint venture company between the Nurol Group of Turkey and the BAE Systems" of the U.S.¹⁹³ This project was aimed at producing armored vehicles for the military.

After the coup d'état took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980, the improvement in Turkish-American relations reached a peak. Since the commanders' approach was strongly pro-American, the alliance with the U.S. became the first priority of Turkish Foreign policy. Parallel to these improvements, the U.S. decided not only to

¹⁹¹ Yasemin Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 61.

¹⁹² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 165.

¹⁹³ Army Technology.com, http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/armoured/fmc_nurol/index.html (accessed October 20, 2008).

modernize some airports in Turkey under a “Memorandum of Understanding,” but also “to take its support of Turkey’s military systems one step further by helping to finance the country’s efforts to modernize its troubled air defenses and its defense industry program.”¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, in 1981, the amount of aid supplied to Turkey increased significantly since the 1974 Cyprus intervention. In fact, this military aid “peaked at U.S. \$715 million in 1984.”¹⁹⁵

The amelioration of Turkish–American relations in the beginning of the 1980s was indeed the result of the “policy changes in the United States.”¹⁹⁶ When the Soviet threat reemerged, the U.S. supported a strong and stabilized ally, Turkey, in the region. Therefore, the 1980 military d’état in Turkey was welcomed by the U.S. administration. In order to overcome the Soviet threat, the Reagan administration increased the defense budget, which benefited Turkey. The common perception of an extreme threat paved the way for both countries to act unanimously toward many issues on the world’s agenda. Turkish strategic importance was acknowledged and reaffirmed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle when he said,

In the time that it would take the United States to deliver a division to the upper Gulf in the event of an emergency there, the Soviets could easily deliver 10 divisions...If Turkey is strong then a Soviet Military commander considering a move into a critical region like the Gulf would have to think twice. He would have to think twice because eastern Turkey is within striking distance of those critical Soviet forces based in Transcaucasus.¹⁹⁷

Turkey experienced its golden age regarding Turkish–American relations, when Turgut Ozal, the leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), was elected prime minister in the 1983 elections. Soon after being elected, Ozal expressed his eagerness to make

¹⁹⁴ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 61.

¹⁹⁵ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 165.

¹⁹⁶ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 61, 62.

¹⁹⁷ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 62, quoted in Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkey and the Western Alliance,” *Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*.

adjustments related to the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.¹⁹⁸ In fact, his intentions were very clear. When he declared his slogan to be “trade not aid,”¹⁹⁹ he attempted to lift U.S. tariffs and pave the way for entrepreneurs to improve economic relations with the U.S. Eventually, “American subsidiaries set up a whole range of enterprises from soft-drink bottling plants, to pharmaceutical plants, to aircraft assembly plants.” Turkish cities began to look like “Little America” due to the investments of American companies in areas such as construction, telecommunication, and so forth.²⁰⁰ Moreover, Turkey not only purchased some F-16s from the United States, but also began to manufacture in this field²⁰¹ by sharing a program with General Dynamics regarding the production of F-16 airplanes.

Ozal was able to pave the way for Turkish businessmen, who were encouraged by the liberalist politics of Turgut Ozal, “to lobby Congress on topics of interest to their companies.”²⁰² In addition to these improvements, Turkey and the U.S. agreed to settle a Rapid Deployment Force and renovate some Turkish airfields, adding two new ones to eastern Turkey in order to secure Turkey’s Eastern areas in case of a Soviet attack.²⁰³

Consequently, after the mid 1980s, Turkish–American relations lost their momentum due to a shift in the Soviet policy. When Gorbachev became the head of the Soviet Union in 1985, he pursued a friendlier relationship with the United States and its allies. The Soviet and American governments progressed on negotiations in terms of the elimination of weapons in 1985, which concluded with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (1987) that stipulated the termination of medium and short-range weapons in the near future.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁸ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 31.

¹⁹⁹ Mustafa Aydin and Cagri Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future* (Istanbul: Routledge, 2004), 78.

²⁰⁰ Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective*, 78, 79.

²⁰¹ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 17.

²⁰² Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 79.

²⁰³ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 17.

²⁰⁴ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 63.

Although the Soviet Union was still a threat through the end of the 1980s, its peaceful and friendly approach towards the Western World pushed Turkey to question its importance relevant to containing the Soviets as the Southern flank of NATO. Since Turkish foreign policy was based mainly on its appeal to its allies in terms of containing the Soviets, the decrease in the perception of the common threat, Communism, would be harmful to Turkish vital interests, especially military aid from the U.S.

B. SOME IRRITANTS IN THE 1980S

Despite strong cooperation after the 1980s, some areas became problematic. To begin with, Turkey restricted American activities on American bases in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf towards American bases in Turkey, which in return, discomfited U.S. officials. One reason for the restriction of American activities might be explained by the sensitive approach of the Turkish public to its national sovereignty, which played a large role in the government's decision process.

In addition, in 1983, Turkey was irritated with Congress' proposal "that military aid to Greece and Turkey must be extended at a 7-to-10 (Greece: Turkey) ratio." The Greek lobby's effect was explained in Monteagle Stearns' book as follows: "Congress...agreed on a definition of 'Aegean Balance.' Accepting the views of Greek government, a congressional majority, spearheaded by an articulate coalition of philhellenes, liberals and conservatives with significant Greek-American constituencies decided that the Aegean status quo would not be threatened if U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey were appropriated in a seven-to-ten ratio."²⁰⁵ Turkey denounced the ratio as unjust since the geographic conditions of both countries differ in terms of hostile neighborhoods. Yet, Turkish efforts were ignored by Congress, which in turn wounded mutual relations. Indeed, Turkey realized that it suffered an ineffective lobby in Washington, in comparison with the Greek and Armenian lobbies, despite the attempts of

²⁰⁵ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), 41.

Ozal. Beside the bids to consolidate relations with the U.S., Turkey was a little slow in understanding how politics operate in Washington. For this reason, Turkish-American relations were sometimes wounded.

Related to the lack of a good Turkish lobby in Congress, the Greek lobby pushed Congress to attach the same level of aid to Turkey to the improvement in the Cyprus dispute. Furthermore, the U.S. was uncomfortable when “Turkish Cypriots declared an independent Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus in the fall of 1983, and that Ankara recognized this entity as an independent country.”²⁰⁶ Ankara had no option but recognition, since this was related to national sovereignty, and no one could stand against the extreme domestic pressure regarding the Cyprus debate. On the other hand, although the U.S. administration was more tolerant and understanding of Turkish domestic concerns, lobbies still had the most power in Congress. Hence, the Reagan government pursued the idea of softening the counter-measures against Turkey.

As the Cold War began to slow down, Turkey started to worry about the amount of military aid supplied by the U.S. Therefore, “after the expiry of the 1980 DECA in 1985, Turkey pushed hard for stronger guarantees on aid deliveries and signed a new DECA only after U.S. secretary of State George Shultz agreed that the administration would vigorously press Congress on this issue.”²⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the military aid, which was increased to \$715 million in 1984, dropped back to \$526 million by Congress in 1988.²⁰⁸

One of the more confrontational issues concerned the domestic issues of America related to the aggressive Armenian attitudes towards Turkey and Turkish diplomats in the U.S. In 1972, the Turkish Consul General, Mehmet Baydar and his Vice Consul, Bahadir Demir were killed by an Armenian-American, Gourgen Yanikas, in Santa Barbara.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 62.

²⁰⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 165.

²⁰⁸ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 17.

²⁰⁹ “ATAA Remembers the Victims of Armenian Terrorism,” http://www.armenianreality.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=15 (accessed November 28, 2008).

Ten years later, Kemal Arikан, the Turkish Consul General, was killed by Hampig Sassounian in Westwood, California.²¹⁰ Although afterwards, sufficient counter-measures to protect Turkish facilities and diplomats were enforced by the U.S. government, “these events colored the Turkish reaction to the rising tide of Armenian agitation pressing Congress to pass resolutions condemning Ottoman [alleged] Turkish ‘genocide’ in the large scale of the [alleged] killing of Armenians in 1915,”²¹¹ which was, in this author’s opinion, a relocation of the Armenians due to the security concerns of the Ottoman Empire at that time. American Armenians worked hard to influence the Congressmen of the U.S. to pass the resolution every time, but still it failed. Usually, California senators supported all of these proposals, where the Armenian population was significant. Beginning in the mid-1980s, these [alleged] ‘genocide’ proposals were renewed every year and regularly defeated by the republican administration. As a result, these proposals “failed to be enacted” and were called “blackmail” by the Turkish government.²¹² In fact, Armenians were trying to cover their attacks in the U.S. against Turkish-American communities in those years by renewing the alleged genocide proposal.²¹³ On the other hand, as mentioned in Article 11 of the Armenian constitution, Armenians claimed that some eastern parts of Turkish territory belonged to them. And, they had a plan consisting of four stages to regain these territories from Turkey. As Harut Sassounian, the publisher of the *Courier California* newspaper mentioned, the first stage was to introduce the alleged Armenian Genocide to the world, which was accomplished. The second stage was to force Turkey to acknowledge the alleged genocide. The third stage was compensation from Turkey for the alleged genocide, and the last stage was to put some eastern Turkish territory inside Armenian borders where the alleged genocide

²¹⁰ “ATAA Remembers the Victims of Armenian Terrorism,” http://www.armenianreality.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=139&Itemid=15 (accessed November 28, 2008).

²¹¹ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 77.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 265.

occurred.²¹⁴ Turkey, however, objected to the Armenian claims in order to stop the Armenian plan of demanding territory from Turkey.

Another contentious issue in the 1980s was the increasing Kurdish insurgency, which was a domestic problem until the “Kurdish Workers Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) set up its training camps in neighboring countries, and when the tactics used by the [Turkish] government to fight the insurgency were criticized by the Western World.”²¹⁵ Even though in the very beginning of the 1980s, Turkey was charged with systematic and widespread violation of human rights by the European countries, “the Department of State took the position that ‘there is no evidence that brutality and torture are widespread and systematic.’” However, by 1989, “the tone had changed” and U.S. officials began to report serious violations and the denial of human rights. Some of these violations were described as restrictions on freedom of thought in regards to journalists and writers. According to U.S. reports, the Turkish press and its writers were not free to express their thoughts. Although the Bulent Ecevit government worked on it in 1999, Washington was not satisfied with Ankara’s efforts.²¹⁶ In fact, Washington’s critics were focused on Article 301 of the Turkish constitution, which stipulates punishment for those people “insulting Turkishness.” Hence, the U.S. claimed that this article impeded freedom of thought in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was condemned by the U.S. “for waging a full-fledged war against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL.”²¹⁷

Frankly, it was easy to understand the different stands of the U.S. in the early and late 1980s. In the beginning of the 1980s, the world witnessed the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Shah revolution in Iran, and the taking of American diplomats as hostages in Iran. The emergence of the Soviet threat and instability in the Middle East pushed the U.S. to strengthen its alliance with Turkey, who was sharing the same concerns as the U.S., and pursuing an alliance. Thus, the U.S. put a blind eye to the

²¹⁴ Ermeni Diasporasının 4T Plani, <http://www.ensonhaber.com/Gundem/98281/Ermeni-diasporasinin-4T-plani.html> (accessed November 22, 2008).

²¹⁵ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 70.

²¹⁶ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 76.

²¹⁷ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 70.

international calls related to the *alleged* violation of human rights in Turkey. However, when the Soviet threat faded at the end of the 1980s, the U.S. began to focus on Iraq, which made it shift its policy towards Turkey.

Although some areas of conflict were to continue, Turkish-American relations were maintained at a high level from 1980 to 1989. Turkey kept taking economic advantage of the alliance by “counting on increased U.S. investment and greater access to U.S. markets to offset reduced aid.” Some American companies, such as General Dynamics, FMC, and so forth, filled out the space that “compromise[d] a pro-Turkey corporate lobby,” which Turkey was lacking before.²¹⁸

On the other hand, the containment of the Soviets was facilitated by a trustworthy ally, Turkey, for the U.S. “American installations in Turkey facilitated the detection and interception of Soviet airpower into the Eastern Mediterranean [and] Turkey’s land mass and bases deterred Soviet designs on the Persian Gulf.”²¹⁹

C. POST-COLD WAR ERA

The Soviet Union’s surrender to an intervention in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany ushered in a new era in which “Turkey’s role as a bulwark against the Communist threat on NATO’s eastern flank”²²⁰ faded significantly. Turkish foreign policy witnessed a period of instability and uncertainty. In fact, the end of the Cold War abolished the most important reason for Turkey to stay attached to the West, especially the U.S. Therefore, Turkey proceeded to define her importance to the West in other ways in an effort to refrain from completely separating from the West, which would be at odds with Ataturk’s policy.

²¹⁸ Omer Karasapan, “Turkey and U.S. Strategy in the Age of Glasnost,” *Middle East Report* no. 160, (September-October 1989), 10.

²¹⁹ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 76.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

Since Turkey’s strategic importance declined as a “front line state against the Soviet Union”²²¹ in 1990, Turgut Ozal “portray[ed] Turkey as the West’s bridge to the Turkic states on Russia’s southern border,”²²² which was an insufficient attempt to revitalize Turkey’s strategic importance. The 1990–1991 Gulf War presented a more promising opportunity for Turkey²²³ “to reaffirm Ankara’s commitment to U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey’s importance to U.S. strategic interests and concerns in the Middle East.”²²⁴

On August 2, 1990, the stability in the Middle East was broken down when Kuwait was invaded by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Saddam’s aggression launched a new field of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. as both countries’ concerns “tended to converge” in terms of “expansionist policies of regional states that threaten[s] to alter the status quo.”²²⁵ Although hesitant to take active precautions in the beginning, Turkey decided to shut off the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and relations with Iraq were propped up temporarily.²²⁶ Turkey’s reluctance to join the coalition forces in the beginning could be explained by strong opposition in the parliament and among the public. Both the left wing and the right wing in the parliament, as well as the public’s concerns, were focused on the “alleged adventurism”²²⁷ of Turgut Ozal. Since the future (after the war) was cloudy, and Turkey might be severely damaged by Saddam’s missiles, these opposition groups did not want to sacrifice the ongoing Turkish neutrality policy to American interests in the region, which might jeopardize Turkey’s political and economic status. Yet Turkey was the “first nation in the region” to condemn the invasion and “to support

²²¹ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 77.

²²² Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, 2000), 191.

²²³ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 80.

²²⁴ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 77, quoted in Sabri Sayari, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,” *Middle East Journal* 46 no. 1 (Winter 1992): 14.

²²⁵ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 95.

²²⁶ William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East, and the Gulf Crisis,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 68, no. 4 (October 1992): 684.

²²⁷ Ibid., 685.

the UN sanctions...by shutting down Iraq's pipeline.”²²⁸ Furthermore, after intense debates between the government and high-level military officials, 100,000 Turkish soldiers were mobilized to the Iraqi border, “pinning down substantial Iraqi forces.”²²⁹ In addition to these, Turkey supported the U.S. not only militarily, by allowing Americans to use the Incirlik base for operations in Iraq, but also diplomatically, by backing up the Bush administration on international platforms.²³⁰

Turkey extended its support of the United States in the following years. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Balkans witnessed brutal ethnic conflicts. As in the Gulf War, the opportunity for instability and altering the status quo, put Turkey and the U.S. on the same page again. When the violence in the Balkans began to increase, Turkey replaced its passive diplomacy with an active one in Europe and the international arena in order to contain the brutal attacks of the Serbians against the Bosnian Muslim Community.²³¹ Although the U.S. had followed a non-intervention policy towards the Balkans in the beginning, afterwards they were persuaded to adopt an active policy to move the conflicts from Bosnia to Kosovo.

As a result of the U.S.’ active policy, the Dayton Agreement was signed on 21 November 1995, which was welcomed by Turkish officials and the public since “Bosnia-Herzegovina was reconstituted...as a single state.”²³² As a result of the Kosovo crisis between 1998–1999, NATO launched an air campaign against Serbia, which was followed by “an international peacekeeping force, known as KFOR” to prevent Serbian violence over Kosovar Albanians.²³³

Turkish-American cooperation had solidified on both platforms. In Bosnia, Turkish soldiers worked with U.S. soldiers in the “NATO Enforcement/Stability Force

²²⁸ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 77.

²²⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 166.

²³⁰ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 96.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000*, 263.

²³³ Ibid.

(IFOR/SFOR) that was established to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement.”²³⁴ Moreover, Turkey participated in the “armament and the training of the Bosnian Federation Army” program, which was “appreciated by the Americans” since it stopped the Iranians from extending their influence over the Balkans.²³⁵ In the Kosovo case, Turkey backed up the peacekeeping operations of the U.S. and contributed to the NATO force by a number of F-16s.²³⁶

Another area of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. was Central Asia. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, new Turkic countries that were excessively vulnerable to instability emerged. In this case, the U.S. encouraged Turkey to take an initiative towards these countries in terms of “shaping their system in accordance with democratic and secular models.”²³⁷ The U.S. aimed to prevent the expansionist movements of Russia and Iran using Turkey, due to Turkey’s historical ties. In compliance with its goal, the U.S. reinforced the idea of constructing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in a variety of other options. Additionally, the Turkish undertaking of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project (BSECP) was appreciated by the U.S., as it was in total agreement with the U.S.’ interests, and “Turkey would be able to affect the political and economic development of the former Soviet countries in the Black Sea region in such a way as to foster democratic political systems and capitalist economies in these newly independent states.”²³⁸

Turkish-American cooperation was kept going in the Middle East by using Israel. Turkey signed defense cooperation agreements in February and August 1996 with Israel that included joint military exercises, permission for Israeli naval forces to utilize the Turkish ports, and for Israeli air forces to operate training flights over designated parts of

²³⁴ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 97.

²³⁵ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 285.

²³⁶ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 97.

²³⁷ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 287.

²³⁸ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 79.

Anatolia. The mutual relations were strengthened by Suleyman Demirel's "official visit to Jerusalem" after the agreements. These improvements were appreciated by the U.S. administration as the balance of power in the Middle East was tending to the U.S. side to deter Iranian influence in the region.²³⁹ Furthermore, Washington hoped that the Turkish-Israel alliance would facilitate the "Palestinian-Israeli peace process."²⁴⁰ Turkey started pursuing friendlier relations with Israel, since Israel was a trustworthy ally in terms of defending against ballistic missiles. Then the alliance promised an opportunity for the Turkish government to contain the "power of Iran, Iraq and Syria." But, without a doubt, Turkey's primary goal in establishing an alliance with Israel was to gain the support of the Israeli lobby in the American Congress against the Greek and Armenian lobbies.²⁴¹

The U.S. gave its full support to the Turkish government both on Customs Union and European Union issues. Eventually, Turkey became a member of the Customs Union in 1996 in which the U.S. was a trusted supporter of the Turkish government. Additionally, Washington was willing to put pressure on Europe to the benefit of Ankara regarding the integration of Turkey into the EU, which in return became an irritant in terms of transatlantic relations with both Europe and the U.S.²⁴²

Contrary to the European countries and some international institutions, in terms of the Turkish government's fight with the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL), the U.S. "concurred with [Ankara's] claims that human rights violations were neither systematic nor government sanctioned, but the result of police officers taking the law into their own hands."²⁴³ Also, the U.S. appreciated Turkey for improving its democracy and democratic institutions. The most important part was the cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Washington

²³⁹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 288.

²⁴⁰ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 96.

²⁴¹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 289.

²⁴² Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 101,102.

²⁴³ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 79.

declared the PKK/KONGRA-GEL a terrorist organization and supplied the Turkish army in its fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. In February 1999, pro-American voices spread among the Turkish public when Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL and accused of creating 30,000 Turkish martyrs, was captured by the CIA while leaving the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and delivered to Turkish Intelligence Officers.

The year 1999 witnessed reciprocal visits of high-level politicians between two countries. First Suleyman Demirel as the president of Turkey, then Bulent Ecevit as the prime minister visited the U.S. In return, President Clinton made a visit to Turkey in November in which he patted a kid's head in Golcuk, which had suffered from an earthquake. While his friendly attitude was appreciated by the Turkish public, the head-patting event was criticized by the press as simply a gesture to curry American favor. Nevertheless “these visits strengthened the *strategic nature* of the relationship,” since Clinton described the mutual relations as a *strategic partnership* in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1999.²⁴⁴

On November 22, 2000, Turkey had to struggle with a significant financial crisis that had deteriorated when the IMF refused to pay money that it had previously promised.²⁴⁵ When the IMF declared that Turkey did not meet the standards for borrowing any more money, Turkey needed help from Washington. Finally when the U.S. administration operated as a conciliator between Turkey and the IMF, the IMF supplied the amount of 10 billion dollars to Turkey. When another economic crisis emerged in February 2001, Washington, under the Bush administration backed Turkey in its “negotiations with the World Bank and IMF.”²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 23-25 (refers to the entire paragraph).

²⁴⁵ Ercan Uygur, “Krizden Krize Turkiye: 2000 Kasim ve 2001 Subat Krizleri,” 6-17.

²⁴⁶ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 26, 27.

D. PROBLEMATIC AREAS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

As the common threat faded, Turkey was concerned that its strategic importance would not appeal to the U.S. anymore. Thus, Ozal took the responsibility on his own, despite strong objections from the military and other elite parties, and joined the coalition forces in the Gulf War. His main goal was “to reestablish Turkey’s strategic importance in the eyes of Western powers, especially the United States.” In other words, he wanted “to reinvent Turkey’s value to the West.” Consequently, from his point of view, the overthrow of Saddam would bring democracy to Iraq, by which government control in Northern Iraq would be reestablished, resulting in the termination of PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities in the region.²⁴⁷ In addition, Ozal wanted to have a say, after the war, in terms of the re-establishment of Iraq. In contrast, elite parties and military officials were worried about the uncertainties of the future, so they stood up for neither risking Turkey’s status quo nor participating in the coalition against Iraq.

The main divergence in partnership emerged in terms of the “approach to Iraq.” For the U.S., overthrowing Saddam and the “collapse of Ba’athist regime in Baghdad” were at the top of the agenda. From Washington’s perspective, this should be “achieved through the enforcement of UN-backed economic and trade sanctions.” Moreover, Washington was in favor of supporting opposition groups against Saddam, including the Kurds, in the Northern part of Iraq. Contrary to American views, Ankara was eager to restore economic relations with Iraq immediately after the war, as it was not satisfied with American compensation, due to the shut-off of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Furthermore, American attitudes encouraging the Kurds in Northern Iraq against Saddam raised significant concerns as this could result in “the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq,” which would undoubtedly affect the Turkish struggle against separatist Kurdish movements.²⁴⁸ For Ankara, nothing was more important than Iraq’s territorial integrity.

²⁴⁷ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 223.

²⁴⁸ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 97.

Consequently, the U.S. encouragement of Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani “to revolt against Saddam Hussein’s regime” ended up with a brutal suppression of rebellions by Saddam. As a result, “thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to Iran[ian]” and Turkish borders. Due to the cloudy future and heavy economic responsibility regarding the refugees, Turkey proposed forming a security zone above the 36th parallel in Northern Iraq, “where the Kurds would be protected and a no-fly zone would be established.” Rather than a solution, the enforcement of security and a no-fly zone became a problem for Ankara as the region (above the 36th parallel) appeared to be a *safe heaven* for “anti-Turkish, Kurdish guerrilla activity and a base for the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to launch attacks into Turkey.”²⁴⁹

Worse than this was the American report calling “the Turkish Kurds a minority” and reminding Turkish officials of their responsibilities “concerning basic human rights.”²⁵⁰ It was clear that the U.S. administration did not let Turkey have any freedom of action, in terms of its struggle with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, when Steny H. Hoyer stated in Congress:

Passage of this bill sends an unequivocal message to the government of Turkey that this Congress will conduct business as usual when U.S.-supplied equipment is used against civilians.²⁵¹

Turkish human rights gradually became an issue in America, especially during the Carter administration. At the end of the 1990s, U.S. reports were publicly “criticizing Turkish practices rather strongly, objecting to torture, administrative detention, restrictions on free speech, and the like.”²⁵² Hence, the U.S. pushed Ankara to be more sensitive to human rights.

²⁴⁹ Celik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, 80, 81.

²⁵⁰ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 280.

²⁵¹ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 280, quoted in Obrad Kesic, “American Turkish Relations at a Crossroads,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 6, no. 1, (1995): 107.

²⁵² Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari, *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 194.

Turkish-Greek conflicts had important effects on Turkish-American relations. The U.S.’ position between the two countries was very delicate. Both sides wanted the U.S. to support its policy over the other one. Thus, U.S. actions were always criticized by both sides. Cyprus was still a headache in the post-Cold War era. The Clinton administration was strongly protested by the Turkish public in 1998, when Richard Holbrooke, American mediator for Cyprus, put the failure of his attempts on Turkish Cypriots and announced “1974 Turkish intervention as a violation of the 1959 London-Zurich accords...”²⁵³

The Caucasus also emerged as a tricky area in the relations. Since Russia was still a threat to Turkey, Ankara gave strong opposition “to the Russian violations of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in the northern Caucasus and the re-stationing of Russian forces along Turkey’s borders in Georgia and Azerbaijan,”²⁵⁴ which fell upon deaf ears in Washington. The friction in relations regarding the Caucasus reached its peak when the Turkish press claimed that the U.S. was supplying arms instead of humanitarian aid to the newly established Armenia, with Turkey being used as a corridor. Turkey then prohibited using its territory for humanitarian aid through Armenia. Consequently, Congress excluded Azerbaijan “from U.S. assistance by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,”²⁵⁵ which, in return, was condemned by Ankara. As always, the Armenian lobby in Congress was the “hero” for this kind of decision.

Another fragile period was the 1996-97 Erbakan-Ciller coalition government period. Necmettin Erbakan was the head of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). His first intention was to reduce Turkey’s commitments to the Western world in terms of NATO and so forth. His plan was to turn Turkey’s face towards the Islamic countries, specifically “cultivating relations with Libya, and Iran, two of the United States’ most prominent *betes noires* in the Middle East.”²⁵⁶ The irritation of the U.S., due to

²⁵³ Makovsky and Sayari, *Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, 193.

²⁵⁴ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 98.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 226.

Erbakan's Islamist movements, became publicly clear when Morton Abramowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, gave a speech saying, "How do you deal with a NATO ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO, fundamentally anti-Semitic, and fundamentally pro-Islamist, even when he's largely behaving himself?"²⁵⁷ In 1997, Erbakan resigned due to pressure from high-ranking military commanders.

Nothing could be trickier than dealing with Iraq in terms of Turkish-American relations. As Abramowitz put it in 1993, "The most significant American strategic interest in the region remains containment of Iran in the long term and of Iraq right now because of the U.S. commitment to protect the Kurds of northern Iraq. One day the United States may have to decide how committed it is to the seemingly contradictory goals of protecting the Kurds and preserving Iraq's territorial integrity."²⁵⁸ As Abramowitz predicted, in 1998 the Kurdish problem in Northern Iraq reemerged. When Kurdish groups began to fight with each other, the U.S. gathered the Kurdish leaders in Washington DC yielding a peace agreement between the Kurdish groups. Turkey was rankled by the U.S.' attitude as Turkey was not invited to the peace process. However, the most disturbing part for Turkish officials was "the call for a federation." Because Turkey strictly opposed anything "more than a local autonomy," Ankara's response came immediately, and "upgrad[ed] its diplomatic ties with Iraq to ambassadorial level."²⁵⁹ Any partition or federal system in Iraq would harm Turkish interests because it might provoke a similar demand in Turkey's southeastern territory that could result in extensive conflicts or fights. Nevertheless, in the following months, the U.S. administration took steps that eased Ankara's concerns, by promising to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity.

Another irritant in 1998 was the dissatisfaction of Ankara due to the insufficient pressure Washington put on Syria. Turkey initiated a strong-willed military campaign against PKK/KONGRA-GEL activities and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1998. Hence, Syria was forced to stop giving support to the PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Abdullah

²⁵⁷ Hale, Quoted in Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan," *Survival* 39 (1997): 99.

²⁵⁸ Morton Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal," *Foreign Policy*, no. 91 (Summer 1993): 180.

²⁵⁹ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 170.

Ocalan. However, in the beginning, the U.S. was reluctant to take any active steps since it was afraid of destroying the Syria-Israel peace process. But afterwards, when Washington enhanced its support of Turkey and captured Abdullah Ocalan, the tension was relieved.²⁶⁰

The Desert Fox Operation in 1998 created more friction in the relations. The U.S. and British Forces launched air strikes towards Iraq to destroy MWD using the Incirlik air base. When Ankara complained about not being consulted, Turkish and American Military officials held a meeting in 1999 that resulted in amendments to the “Document of Engagement Rules,” “signed among the military authorities of Turkey, the United States, and Britain.”²⁶¹

In addition, Greek and Armenian lobbies increased tensions between Turkey and the U.S. They typically used military and economic aid as a weapon, by threatening to decrease them, which eventually ended in 1998. At irregular intervals, the Armenians pushed Congress to pass a resolution regarding the *alleged* genocide of the 1914 relocation. The last proposal before 9/11 was rejected by the Clinton administration, but Ankara was prepared with a counter plan.²⁶² Yet, Armenian and Greek lobbies were still much more influential in the U.S. compared to Turkish lobbies.

The last quarrel before 9/11 was regarding “the legitimacy of the U.S. attacks,” which intensified over Baghdad after the election of George W. Bush in 2000. Aggressive attitudes towards Iraq were met with great concern in Ankara, blaming the U.S. for “having no clear policy toward that country.”²⁶³ However, all these tensions and divergences were replaced by cooperation after the 9/11 attacks.

²⁶⁰ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 75.

²⁶¹ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 34, 35.

²⁶² Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 193-195.

²⁶³ Ibid., 173.

E. 9/11 ATTACKS AND AFTERWARDS

Although the younger Bush was reluctant to give support to Ankara in terms of the IMF, after the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, due to the strategic importance of Turkey in an age of vague threats, Bush adopted the policies of his predecessor, President Clinton. He took advantage of economic aid as an instrument to improve Turkish security and its “westward-orientation.” Ismail Cem, who was the Foreign Minister of Turkey at that time, made a visit to Washington, and solidified the strategic partnership and cooperation between two countries “regarding the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Turkish Israeli ties and Iraq.”²⁶⁴ Thus, the infrastructure of further cooperation before 9/11 was almost ready.

When the 9/11 attacks occurred, Ankara was one of the very first countries to strongly condemn the terrorist attacks as Turkey had suffered from terrorism for almost seventeen years. Turkey saw this chance as an opportunity to carry out its fight with terror on international platforms and obtain the support of other countries. Hence, Ankara decided to contribute to all Washington’s efforts in terms of terrorism, both diplomatically and militarily.

When Washington declared “Iran and Iraq rogue regimes” and initiated a military campaign against terrorist activities all over the world, Turkey’s strategic and moral importance was revalued in the eyes of American policy makers. Thus, the priorities in the relations between Turkey and the U.S. were to slide again from an economic dimension to a security and military dimension. In this context, “the prosecution of the war against terror, halting the spread of WMD...and enhancing Turkey’s utility as a strategic ally and a member of potential coalitions of the willing,” moved to the top of the agenda.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Rachel Prager, “Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues,” *Georgetown University*, 2003, 10.

²⁶⁵ Prager, “Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues,” 10, 11.

Ankara abided by its promises and even went further, which enhanced expectations in Washington. First of all, American troops were authorized to use Turkish airbases for operations against terrorism. Moreover, Turkey took command of the “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from July 2002 to January 2003, providing 1,400 of the total 4,500 ISAF troops.” Turkish-American cooperation was extended to “terrorism consultations in which Turkish officials shared their experiences in fighting terrorism with American officials.” Turkey contributed to the anti-terror efforts in Florida by deploying military officials there. Indeed, molding international opinion in its fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL was not Ankara’s only aim; it was pushing to be actively involved in the efforts against terrorism. Being a Muslim country, Ankara was afraid of being exploited by the ignorant fundamentalists, which might in return appear as a “threat to the secular Turkish state.”²⁶⁶

Additionally, Turkey benefited from improving its strategic importance in the eyes of its Western allies, as not only a democratic and secular Muslim state in the middle of a troubled area, but also in the economic area by emerging as the most secure and trustworthy country for the “energy corridors of the Central Asia and the Caucasus.” When this opportunity coincided with the strategic interests of the Bush administration, Turkey’s economic agenda gained a brand new momentum. On the other side, the U.S. supported Turkey in its initiatives and enhanced cooperation with Ankara in certain areas. In fact, this was a clever policy for Washington as the fight against terrorism was interpreted as a war between Christians and Muslims. To get rid of this image, the U.S. looked to Turkey’s support as a strategic ally, which demonstrated to the world that Washington’s war on terrorism was not just against Muslims, as the population of Turkey is 99 percent Muslim.²⁶⁷

Despite intense cooperation in terms of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” a significant gap between the policies of both countries towards Iraq began to appear. In March 2002, this gap became clear when Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit spoke in the EU

²⁶⁶ Prager, “Turkish-American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues.”

²⁶⁷ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 311, 312.

meeting stating, “it is not necessary to undertake a military operation... [That] Iraq has been under strict control and is not in a position to inflict harm on its neighbors.”²⁶⁸ In the following months, Ankara’s willingness to cooperate with Washington over terrorism was replaced by considerable concerns, due to increasing pressures and requests from Washington. After Congress authorized the Bush administration to launch a war against Iraq in October 2002, Washington’s requests unfolded as permission to use Turkish land for “American forces in order to wage a war from a northern front, to influx a total of 80,000 American soldiers and 250 fighter aircrafts to Turkey” and assignment of some Turkish “airports and harbors...for the use of the United States and the Coalition Forces.”²⁶⁹ Even though these requests were renewed often, the Turkish government was able to put them off until March 1, 2003. When the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected all the American requests and denied the location of American forces on Turkish territory, Turkish-American relations stepped into a new era.

F. CONCLUSION

In a general sense, Turkish-American relations experienced their best time since World War II after the 1980s, with very few exceptions. Both countries’ approaches towards each other were more tolerant, more sensitive to problematic areas and “more understanding.” Although the international structure had witnessed an important change after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in contrast to the expectations of deterioration in Turkish-American relations, due to the absence of the threat of Communism, Turkish-American relations continued to proceed in a cooperative manner much better than the period before the 1990s.²⁷⁰

The new environment after Soviet integration, revalued Turkish strategic importance to the U.S. Turkish military cooperation with the U.S. was extended to the

²⁶⁸ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, 345, quoted in Nicole Pope, “Concerns Over Iraq,” *Middle East International*, March 22, 2002, 19.

²⁶⁹ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 38, 39.

²⁷⁰ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 104.

Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia, which appeared as new areas of trouble. The energy reserves in the former Soviet countries, and their distribution to the allies via safe energy corridors, occupied an important part of the agenda in terms of cooperation.²⁷¹ Consequently, the common initiatives against the Serbian's aggressive intentions of genocide in the Balkans solidified the alliance. Then, Turkish policy makers welcomed Washington's full support for Ankara to be included in the European Union. The war on terrorism had improved the "strategic partnership" between two countries.

However, there were still some important areas of discomfort in the relations between the two countries in this period. As usual, the weakness of the Turkish lobbies in Congress was exploited by the strong Armenian and Greek lobbies, which ended economic and military aid and the attempts to pass a resolution regarding the *alleged* genocide of the Armenians under Ottoman rule in 1915. The most important attempt was pulled back by the Clinton administration in 2000. Another irritant period was during the 1996-97 Erbakan government, due to Erbakan's friendly policies towards the Islamic countries, which were to be kept under control, according to Washington. Erbakan's attempts to shift Turkish policy from West to East ended with the commanders' strict warning in February 1997 that deposed the Erbakan government.

The main divergence in the relations, after the 1980s, took place due to differing approaches to Iraq and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Cooperation in the Gulf War faded after the policies of both countries began to conflict. Turkey's main concerns regarding the integrity of Iraqi territory and a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi problem, rather than a military solution after the Gulf War were not satisfactorily taken into consideration by Washington. Moreover, Washington's unilateral attempts for reconciliation between Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq, from which Turkey was excluded, increased the level of concerns in Ankara. In addition, the U.S.' reports, which turned into a condemnation after 1995, of Turkey, in terms of human rights regarding Turkey's war on terrorism with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, in contrast to the previous years, opened a gap in the relations.

²⁷¹ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 105.

Despite all this friction, Turkey stood up for the U.S. as “an indispensable country” as Turkey is located in the center of recently developing American policies regarding “the rediscovery of geopolitics on Europe’s periphery especially in the Caspian and growing emphasis on the challenges of weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation and regional power projection.” From the Turkish point of view, the U.S. is the only country and superpower, other than Europe, that is capable of improving the peace process in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. According to Turkish foreign policy makers, improving its relations with the U.S. would enhance Turkish security, economic and political benefits, and its role as a regional power in an area of uncertainties. Thus, the Turkish-American relationship strengthened in the period of the 1980s until 2003 under the terms of the strategic partnership. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the strategic partnership did not bring the two countries to the same page in terms of all the issues on the agenda.²⁷²

²⁷² Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 294, 295.

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V. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER 2003

The regained momentum of the relations in the previous period decelerated through the end of 2002 due the run up to the Iraq campaign and got stuck in 2003 at the outbreak of fighting. Ultimately, this process accorded greater patterns, observable in this study, within the Turkish-American strategic partnership. Since Turkey had previously evaded a patron-client relationship and torn away from dependence on the U.S. for its foreign policy, Ankara's multi-lateral foreign policy ended with some uneasy feelings between the two countries. Until the Second Iraq war, Turkey backed almost all diplomacy by the U.S. around the world. However, during this period, Turkish and American strategic interests seemed to diverge over Iraq on some definite issues, which are mentioned below. Thus, Turkey broke away and followed its own policy. Since the Bush administration did not get the approval of the UN for its Iraqi campaign in 2003, Turkey hesitated to give full support to the U.S. Moreover, in the 2002-03 episode, the disputed area was on Turkey's southern border, pushing Turkey to be more careful., As a result of bilateral frictions described below, Turkish-American interests were significantly damaged. Nevertheless, after a detailed revision of foreign policy in the further course of the present decade, each side realized that it was unable to proceed without the other. In this context, despite some incidents in 2003, Turkish-American relations began to improve, especially after the low point of 2004. The history of security cooperation was renewed by all sides; as the author argues, Turkish-American relations are fated to improve. After each respective shock comes an improvement because this is the destiny of the relations and because Turkey and the U.S. share the same principles at the core; only the details vary. As a result of these messy details in crisis, relations worsened again in 2003, but improved after 2004.

The Iraq War of 2003 was the worst experience in the Turkish-American relationship in modern history. This experience was entirely contrary to the previous "patron-client relationship," since this time Turkey resisted American demands, and at the end, rejected the most important one of them: a Turkish axis of assault on Iraq and a kind of northern front from the perspective of American troops. The significance of the

second Turkish front border was derived especially from its closeness with the operational and tactical areas of combat, in terms of logistic and personnel support. Hence, the tension escalated, deepening the wounds of the bi-lateral relations. The derailed relations required significant repair once the initial campaign ended and the protracted conflict took hold in Iraq with the insurgency. Due to these problems,, mutual visits were conducted to repair the diplomatic and security relations.

On the other side, Turkish-American relations solidified and became more tangible in terms of strategic concept via “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership” in this period. A strategic partnership necessitates sharing the same core principles, since it means a long-term partnership on the basis of common ideology. Thus, it is also a strong indicator that the Turkish-American partnership will continue long term, despite conflicts in the recent short term.

A. DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE IRAQ INVASION

The Turkish-American agenda gradually became occupied by Iraq, from the beginning of 2002. Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit met with U.S. President George Bush on January 16, 2002, which was interpreted as the start of intense Iraq diplomacy between Ankara and Washington. Neither side could reach a consensus in this meeting since American attitudes were more in favor of a unilateral action, without caring so much about Turkish sensitivities regarding Iraq. This divergence went to some degree of extremism when George Bush declared “Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ in his speech on January 29, 2002,” referring to a strong fight with these countries. In response, General Tuncer Kilinc, Secretary of War Academies,²⁷³ pointed out the opportunity for Turkey to shift its foreign policy, in terms of warmer relations with Iran and Russia,²⁷⁴ in case of chaos in the Middle East.

Yet, this divergence was halted by a Turkish military mission, as the commander of the ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, for an eight-month period from June

²⁷³ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 38.

²⁷⁴ “Orgeneral Kilinc: Avrupa Bize Uymaz,” *Radikal*, (March 8, 2002).

2002 until February 2003. Turkey participated in ISAF with 1,300 personnel during this period.²⁷⁵ Once again, Turkey proved its willingness and loyalty to cooperate with the U.S. in terms of the fight against terrorism. Indeed, Turkey intended to demonstrate its willingness to fix the damaged relations. As a response to these friendly Turkish steps, Paul Wolfowitz, 25th United States Deputy Secretary of Defense,²⁷⁶ was hosted by Bulent Ecevit in his office. Wolfowitz delivered the U.S. administration message to Ecevit regarding the expectations of the U.S., related to the positive inputs of Ankara towards a possible operation in Iraq. Wolfowitz also underlined that the U.S. would carry out this operation with or without positive Turkish input, yet the U.S. administration would take care of Turkey's sensitivities on Iraq. Following Wolfowitz's demands, Ecevit reminded him of Ankara's sensitivities and diplomatic red lines, and insisted on Iraq's political and territorial integrity, preventing the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and protecting the Turkmen population in Iraq. Ecevit strongly emphasized these issues and defined the controversies on these issues as unacceptable.²⁷⁷

The next month, in August 2002, the U.S. arranged a meeting in Washington for the Kurdish leaders of Northern Iraq. Ankara was very rankled by this as Turkish officials were not informed about it and not even included in the meeting. Turkish exclusion from the process in Northern Iraq increased apprehensions in Ankara. These apprehensions coincided with the visit of Russian Assistant Foreign Minister Sultanov to Ankara, who offered cooperation with Turkey "against a probable operation" of the U.S. Turkey held its position and waited until the forthcoming elections in November, as Turkey was hoping for a peaceful solution in the region.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ "Turkey's inputs to the International Security and Aid Force," http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_1_Afganistan_Uluslararası_Güvenlik_Yardım_Kuvveti/konular/Turkiyenin_UGYK_Harekatına_Katkıları.htm (accessed November 15, 2008).

²⁷⁶ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Wolfowitz (accessed November 15, 2008).

²⁷⁷ Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, July 2002 publications, <http://www.bayegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/AyinTarihi/2002/temmuz2002.htm> (accessed November 15, 2002).

²⁷⁸ Isyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy," 38.

One of the main concerns of Ankara was the legitimacy of the possible operation. Due to the refusal to sanction the operation in the United Nations, Ankara was reluctant to give full support to the United States. In this context, Turkish concerns, in terms of legitimacy, were conducted to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Turkish president at that time, “during the World Summit...in Johannesburg on September 4, 2002.”²⁷⁹

The next month, the Bush administration became impatient about “waiting for any UN security Council resolutions,” and the U.S. Congress authorized President Bush to wage war on Iraq on October 11.²⁸⁰ Consequently, American demands from Turkey became clear and were explained as: permission for “site inspections”²⁸¹ and the settlement of “eighty thousand American soldiers and 250 fighter aircraft”²⁸² in Turkey, utilization of some airfields and ports in Turkish territory, unlimited utilization of Turkish territory in terms of logistic traffic and flights.²⁸³ All these demands were subject to the approval of the Turkish National Assembly, and would not be decided on until after the Turkish elections, which were to be held in nineteen days. Thus, Turkish parliamentarians suspended these demands until after the elections, since they would be a significant responsibility for the Turkish parliament, in an environment of strong objections from the public. The Turkish public believed that the war in Iraq was unjust and that only the UN could legitimize it. Besides, George Bush’s mistaken use of the word “crusade” regarding the Iraq War inspired conspiracy theories in the Turkish public’s mind, regardless of Bush’s apology.

In compliance with its demands, the U.S. seemed to understand Turkish concerns about Iraq when Robert Pearson, the American ambassador to Turkey at that time,

²⁷⁹ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 30.

²⁸⁰ Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 39.

²⁸¹ Turan, “The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism,” 24.

²⁸² Isyar, “An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 38.

²⁸³ Mustafa Balbay, *Irak Batakliginda Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri*, 4th edition, (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitaplari, 2007), 11. Also see Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 30.

verified that his government opposed not only an independent state in northern Iraq, but also an unbalanced representation in the central government of Iraq related to the Turkmen population (which would eventually have a chair for the Turkmen population around the table for oil resources). Pearson admitted that the government of Iraq should involve the representation of all the groups living in Iraq.²⁸⁴ Therefore, U.S. officials gave the impression that they acknowledged Turkish interests in Iraq.

On November 3, 2002, AKP (the Justice and Development Party) became the new government of Turkey after the general elections. Following the elections, Hilmi Ozkok, chief of the general staff, conducted a visit to the U.S. in which he clarified Turkish concerns about a possible operation in Iraq. These concerns included: the sanctioning problem of the operation by the UN, Turkish economic suffering before the first Gulf War due to unsatisfying compensation by the U.S., and the future of the Kurds related to a possible independent state in the northern part of Iraq.²⁸⁵

In the early days of December, Wolfowitz came to Turkey and renewed American demands, but this time complaining about the slow process of the Turkish bureaucracy. Abdullah Gul, prime minister of Turkey at that time, pacified Wolfowitz by assuring him that site inspection might proceed with the accompaniment of Turkish personnel with their American allies, but that other demands were still subject to parliament's approval. To accelerate the process, Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's upcoming prime minister, was invited to Washington.²⁸⁶ Tayyip was also reluctant to give full support, since the Bush administration guaranteed Iraq's territory, but did not promise compensation for economic losses. Nevertheless, it was clear that Erdogan did not want to alienate the U.S.

²⁸⁴ Speech made by Robert Pearson in the opening of third East Mediterranean Security Conference in October 16, 2002.

²⁸⁵ Balbay, *Irak Batakliginda Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri*, 34, 35, 36, Also see Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 31.

²⁸⁶ Turan, "The United States and Turkey: Limiting Unilateralism," 24, 25.

since a significant mobility, in terms of logistical transportation for the American staff was waiting at the Turkish-Iraqi border after the meeting, which was reported to the Turkish public by the Turkish media.²⁸⁷

Yet, war was the last choice, according to the Turkish Government, a statement that was released to the Turkish press on January 3, 2003 by the secretary of the Turkish presidency as:

War in Iraq is a last resort. There is still hope for a peaceful solution. In order to start a war, there must be international legitimacy. UN Resolution 1441 would not approve a military action. Turkey has red lines in terms of Iraq. These are the territorial and political integrity of Iraq, and the future of Mosul and Kirkuk.²⁸⁸

As a follower of Ataturk's policy, "peace at home, peace in the world," Turkey was still hopeful for a peaceful solution in terms of Iraq. Therefore, Abdullah Gul, prime minister at that time, started a tour of peaceful negotiations through the neighboring countries of Iraq. It started with Syria on January 4, 2003 and was followed by Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Abdullah Gul emphasized the role of the neighboring countries in the region for a peaceful solution; however, he pointed out that Iraq was the country most responsible, and could prevent war if they would abide by the resolutions of the UN.²⁸⁹

On the last day of January 2003, the Turkish National Security Council convened a long-lasting meeting regarding the situation in Iraq. In response to enhancing pressure from Washington in terms of utilizing the bases and deploying American soldiers, the council called for the legitimacy of a possible operation in Iraq as a resolution of the UN Security Council. Also, the Turkish approach towards Iraq was explained as an integrated

²⁸⁷ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 32.

²⁸⁸ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 32, quoted in Balbay, *Irak Batakliginda Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri*, 56.

²⁸⁹ "Basbakan Gul, Suriye Yolunda Onemli Aciklamalar Yapti," *Milliyet*, January 4, 2003, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/01/04/son/sontur07.html> (accessed November 20, 2008).

and unitary Iraq, not a federation. Lastly, it emphasized that in case of an attack on Turkey by Iraq, Turkey would retaliate with an “active defense.”²⁹⁰

Despite Turkey’s intense diplomatic efforts, war appeared to be inevitable as the calendar proceeded. Therefore, Turkey had to develop new policies related to her own interests in case of war. First of all, the Turkish armed forces, in compliance with the announcement of the Turkish National Security Council on January 31, initiated some mobilization of troops and personnel over the Iraqi border, as a precaution against a possible war. In fact, this was reflected as a secret plan, in terms of cooperation with the U.S., which would end as the occupation of some part “of Northern Iraq behind an advancing American army.”²⁹¹ This was interpreted as a bonus to Turkey since Turkey was eager to terminate the activities of PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Northern Iraq by means of a military operation. Yet, since the role of the Turkish army in this area was not clear, it was cancelled. Besides, Washington was still waiting for the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for deploying its troops. As the first result of mutual understanding, TGNA approved “allowing American engineers to begin preparing Turkish military bases for possible use by American troops” on February 6.²⁹²

After this time, it was obvious that despite some concerns, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) seemed to act together with the U.S., even when they did not want to, when peaceful solutions appeared impossible. However, they were restricted for some definite reasons. First of all, most AKP backers were conservatives who strongly opposed the war. To enable a resolution for the deployment of U.S. soldiers would most probably end up with a significant decrease in their percentage of votes. On the other hand, not only their own backers, but an important portion of the Turkish public (the leftists, rightists and almost all political views) was against the war. Milliyet, a popular

²⁹⁰ Barkin Sik, “Asker Savas Yetkisi Istdi.,” *Milliyet*, Ankara, February 1, 2003, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/02/01/siyaset/siy04.html> (accessed November 20, 2008).

²⁹¹ Dexter Filkins, “U.S. in Talks on Allowing Turkey to Occupy a Kurdish Area in Iraq,” *New York Times*, February 6, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/07/international/europe/07TURK.html?ex=1225339200&en=2a916881e233940b&ei=5070> (accessed November 21, 2008).

²⁹² Ibid.

Turkish newspaper, conducted an opinion poll in January asking, “In your opinion, what should be Turkey’s role in a possible war on Iraq?” The results were quite apparent; 70.72 percent did not want to be involved in the war in any way, 24.16 percent wanted to be involved after intense negotiations with the U.S., 3 percent mentioned a permission for just utilization of bases, and .12 percent declared their desire in terms of a second front line in Northern Iraq.²⁹³ According to Nasuh Uslu,²⁹⁴ these anti-war opinions reached 90 percent in the following months. The main reason behind the opposition was the possible deterioration of the Kurdish issue after the war. According to public perceptions as well as the experience of the 1990-1991 war, the U.S. would establish a Kurdish state after the war. Additionally, there was significant distrust among the Turkish public as to American reasons for the war, including claims of the existence of biological weapons. Although the Turkish public believed that Iraq had biological and nuclear weapons, their perception of the reasons for the war was that it was not these weapons. Instead of these *trivial* reasons from the Turkish public’s perspective, Washington was pursuing expanding its hegemony towards the Middle East and Washington’s main purpose was to seize the oil resources there. Furthermore, Washington did not intend to return to the homeland after the war, and would extend the war into Iran and Syria. In addition, Turkey had historical ties with the region and some Turkish people had relatives in Iraq and Syria, since the borders were drawn with a pencil on a table in the Lausanne Conference, without taking care of ethnical ties. For these reasons, the Turkish people were strictly against the war.²⁹⁵

Another irritant was one of the news releases in *The New York Times* indicating that “Turkish forces would be under American command”²⁹⁶ in Northern Iraq, which was

²⁹³ “Olası Irak Operasyonunda Türkiye’nin Rolü Sizce Ne Olmalı?,” *Milliyet*, January 2003, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/anket/milliyetanket.asp?aid=20> (accessed November 21, 2008).

²⁹⁴ Nasuh Uslu, “Turkish Public Opinion toward the United States in the context of Iraq question,” *The Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 3 (2005), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue3/jv9no3a5.html#_ednref18 (accessed November 21, 2008).

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Dexter Filkins, “U.S. in Talks on Allowing Turkey to Occupy a Kurdish Area in Iraq,” *New York Times*, February 6, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/07/international/europe/07TURK.html?ex=1225339200&en=2a916881e233940b&ei=5070> (accessed November 21, 2008).

printed in the Turkish press the next day and provoked strong opposition among the Turkish people. Moreover, the amount of money designated by each side, in terms of compensation for the losses, was not equal. Indeed, there was a big difference in the amount that had been foreseen by each side. Turkey demanded \$32 billion while Washington offered \$6 billion to compensate for losses.²⁹⁷

In the middle of all these debates, the calendar showed March 1, 2003 to be an important day in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, where there would be a vote for a second front line in Northern Iraq. The deployment of American equipment and soldiers, already waiting for the results of the vote on the Mediterranean Sea, just next to Turkish territory, hinged on this vote. The result was “264 yes; 250 no; with 19 abstaining; however, the resolution required the approval of an absolute majority.”²⁹⁸ The assembly rejected the resolution that would enable American troops to be deployed on Turkish territory. This vote was an important keystone in the relations since it was interpreted as the second “serious blow” to the relations after Johnson’s letter of 1964. The U.S. was eager to wage war against Iraq, with or without Turkey, thus after the rejection of the resolution on March 1, President Bush “made a veiled warning to Turkey that it might end up missing its chance to have a say in the future of Iraq and lose a multi-billion dollar aid package to protect its economy from the negative impacts of a war.”²⁹⁹

As a result, in order not to be excluded from the future of Iraq, the Turkish Parliament reacted to Bush’s warning on March 20, 2003 by granting a new resolution, which “allow[ed] the U.S. to use Turkey’s airspace to cross into Iraq for airborne attacks.”³⁰⁰ On the same day, the U.S. declared war on Iraq in a campaign that presently showed the futility of pre-war political assumptions of the U.S. side and increased the need in the Turkish-U.S. bilateral relationship to repair the damage of the immediate past.

²⁹⁷ Ramazan Gozen, “Causes and Consequences of Turkey’s Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003,” *The Turkish Year Book* 36, (2005): 82.

²⁹⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Opinions: Turkey Says No,” *Bulletin of the Academic Scientists* 59, no .4, (July/August 2003): 24.

²⁹⁹ Aylin Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 3, (May 2008): 479.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

B. THE IRAQ INVASION

Eventually, regardless of the decision of TGNA, Iraq was invaded by the U.S. on March 20, 2003. But, it would be useful to understand the reasons for TGNA's rejection of the resolution. To begin with, Ankara and Washington did not have a consensus, especially on certain political and economic areas. Firstly, Turkey requested compensation of 32 billion dollars in a written promise, but Washington only promised, without a written document, 6 billion dollars "and up to \$20 billion as a loan to be approved by the Congress and tied to IMF conditions." Secondly, the situation in Northern Iraq was still unclear. Turkey wished to launch a comprehensive operation in Iraq with American soldiers in order to seize control of the region. Inevitably, this would enable Ankara to terminate the activities of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to some degree, and to back up the Turkmen population in Northern Iraq. Moreover, this would discourage the Kurds, in terms of establishing a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Eventually, Washington found itself in a dilemma. On one side, it did not want to alienate Turkey by rejecting Turkish demands, but on the other side, Kurdish leaders, who had been allies of the U.S. since the Gulf War, did not want Turkish soldiers inside Iraqi borders. Thus, the U.S. tried to put off Ankara by playing some diplomatic games. Thirdly, Turkish calls for participation in the "reconstruction of Iraq after the war" fell upon deaf ears in Washington. In fact, this was a result of Washington's pro-Kurdish approach in Northern Iraq, since Ankara wanted participation in order to support the Turkmen population there.³⁰¹

Apart from these events, internal and international demonstrations affected the decision of TGNA. In Turkey, "from extreme left to extreme right, public opinion was against allowing the United States to deploy troops." In the international arena, most of the civil organizations, especially in Europe, were arranging protests against the U.S. Besides all this, the AKP had the opportunity to pass a resolution in TGNA, since they were more than the absolute majority in the parliament, but "How could the [islamist]

³⁰¹ Gozen, "Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003," 82, 83.

party...assist in a ‘crusade’ as President Bush had been unlucky enough to call it in the immediate aftermath of September 11, against the Muslim Iraqis?”³⁰²

In addition, Turkey was focused on becoming a member of the European Union. When the U.S.’ intentions became clear, in terms of waging a war in Iraq, France and Germany opposed Washington’s intentions at a high level. Rumsfeld declared France and Germany to be the “old Europe” and added that Europe is not France and Germany. According to Rumsfeld, with the exception of these two nations, most of Europe was supporting the U.S.³⁰³ In this context, Turkey might not want to alienate two major powers of Europe by passing the resolution.³⁰⁴

In any case, Turkish intentions, in terms of deploying troops to Northern Iraq after the invasion, stirred up some concerns among makers of policy in Washington. After the announcement of Prime Minister Gul about deploying some Turkish soldiers to Northern Iraq, Bush publicly declared that, “We have got more troops up north, and we’re making it very clear that we expect [the Turks] not to come into northern Iraq.”³⁰⁵ According to Washington, Turkish operations might cause conflicts between Turkish and U.S. soldiers “since the friend and foe identification system would not allow U.S. forces to distinguish Turkish troops from enemy Iraqi forces.” Moreover, Turkish operations would cause fights with Kurdish soldiers in the region “who were *de facto* controlling the region [Northern Iraq].”³⁰⁶

Consequently, the friendly atmosphere of reciprocal relations for fifty years was replaced by an atmosphere of hostility and distrust, not limited to Turkey but wielded against other allies as well. Apparently, Bush used the word *Turks*, when opposing a Turkish intervention in Northern Iraq instead of saying “we advised our Turkish allies or

³⁰² Kibaroglu, “Opinions: Turkey Says No,” 24.

³⁰³ ABD, Fransalmanya arasında Irak Dalası, *Milliyet*, Dis Haberler Servisi <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2003/01/24/dunya/adun.html> (accessed November 23, 2008).

³⁰⁴ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 34.

³⁰⁵ Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 480, quoted in “Bush Warns Turkey off Iraq,” *BBC News*, March 24, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2879299.stm> (accessed November 23, 2008).

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

our Turkish friends” as “his predecessors” did.³⁰⁷ Since all his predecessors, including Bush, called Turkish politicians “our Turkish friends” until that time, Bush’s harsh tone emphasizing the word “Turks” was criticized. Furthermore, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defense Secretary, “openly criticized the Turkish military for not making good on its promise of support and called on Turkey to apologize for the decision of its Parliament.”³⁰⁸ On the first day of May, Bush announced that the combat war was over and the transformation period “from dictatorship to democracy” would begin.³⁰⁹

Just two months after Bush’s declaration, Turkish-American relations worsened to the deepest point ever. On July 4, 2003, the Turkish Headquarters of Turkish Special Forces in Sulaymaniyah/Iraq was exposed to a military operation of U.S. soldiers. “Eleven Turkish officers were detained by” the Americans in an insulting manner. Referring to the American allegations, “Turkish commandos were plotting to assassinate the Kurdish Governor of nearby Kirkuk,” a statement that was firmly repudiated by the Turkish side. The Turkish Soldiers were taken to the American Headquarters “handcuffed and sack[ed] over the head.”³¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Turkish officers were released after three days, but the public’s anger did not disappear. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this was a fatal mistake in terms of the alliance. Since Turkish citizens are very sensitive to their national honor, history would witness another turning point in Turkish-American relations.

The results were dramatic. The “Democratic Left Party (DSP) Chairman, Bulent Ecevit, said that the U.S. had ‘insulted’ Turkey. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader, Devlet Bahceli, said ‘an apology should be made to Turkey’ while the True Path Party (DYP) leader, Mehmet Agar, said ‘it is an incident over which an ultimatum should

³⁰⁷ Kibaroglu, “Opinions: Turkey Says No,” 24.

³⁰⁸ Susan Sachs and Eric Schmitt, “The Reach of War: The President; Courting Allies, Bush Ends Rift with the Turks,” *New York Times*, June 28, 2004, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500EEDE1438F93BA15755C0A9629C8B63&scp=1&sq=wolfowitz%20Turkey%20apologize&st=cse> (accessed November 22, 2008).

³⁰⁹ President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html> (accessed November 22, 2008).

³¹⁰ Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 480.

be made.”³¹¹ According to Sanli Bahadir Koc, Turkey should request a detailed explanation and apology for the incident from the U.S., a guarantee that these incidents would never happen again, and punishment for the responsible personnel. He also added that this should lead the Turkish public and critical institutions to an anti-Americanism that would not be a temporary one.³¹² This incident also became an issue in the movie “Valley of the Wolves in Iraq,” which left its viewers with anti-American feelings.

C. TOWARDS DÉTENTE AND ENTENTE ONCE MORE, 2004-2008

In the following months in 2003, both sides worked toward the improvement of the relations. On September 22, 2003, Turkish Treasury Minister Ali Babacan and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, John Snow, signed an economic agreement that supplied Turkey with a credit of \$8.5 billion. But, it was tied to the condition of cooperation on some issues over Iraq. At the end of signature ceremony, John Snow expressed his positive anticipations in terms of relations, which were injured after the rejection of the resolution by TGNA on March 1.³¹³

Despite keen efforts, it was hard to return to the ‘Golden Age’ of the relations so rapidly. However, the atmosphere between the two countries appeared to be warming when a NATO summit was held in Turkey in June 2004. George Bush announced that Turkey was a model country, with its democratic and peaceful improvements in the region. A further step, in terms of improvement in the relations, was the addition of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL to the terrorist organization list in Washington.³¹⁴ At the end of 2004, Marc Grossman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, highlighted Turkish-American cooperation in terms of Iraq’s integrity, NATO, and “commitment to

³¹¹ Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” 480, 481.

³¹² Sanli Bahadir Koc, “Cirkin Amerikalı ile Guven Bunalimi: Suleymaniye Krizi ve Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri,” *Stratejik Analiz*, (August 2003).

³¹³ Harun Gurek, “Asker Sarti Yok,” *Aksam*, <http://www.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2003/09/23/ekonomi/ekonomi8.html> (accessed November 22, 2008).

³¹⁴ Serdar, *Turkish-American Relations Post 9/11*, 38.

freedom and democracy.” According to Grossman, the fluctuation of the relations during the Iraq War had come to an end, and it was time to further the cooperation. He referred to Secretary Powell’s speech:

Turkey is a good friend, a good ally, and...notwithstanding [any] disappointment of a couple of months ago...we have a good partnership with Turkey and I’m sure it will continue to grow in the years ahead.³¹⁵

The warming atmosphere of 2004 moved its effect into 2005 and Turkey once again became the commander of ISAF in Kabul/Afghanistan. From February to August, Turkish Armed Forces contributed to ISAF with one of its brigades and some extra personnel.³¹⁶

Both Turkey and the U.S. have made intense efforts to repair the deterioration of the relations since 2003. In this context, reciprocal visits by high-level officials and politicians took place. The most important result of these visits was the “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership,” which was signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul. By this agreement, cooperation between the two countries was furthered and spread through other areas such as economy and technology. This document was a first in Turkish-American history, which was accepted as “a road map defining the direction and the scope of the bilateral cooperation.” According to this document, the Turkish-American Economic Partnership Commission developed an ‘Action Plan’ that foresaw a “diversifying” in the relations in terms of “economy, trade, energy, investment, science & technology, research & development programs, academic cooperation and human to human interaction.” This plan is still active and was last updated in April 2008.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ Marc Grossman, “The U.S.-Turkish Partnership,” *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 27, (Winter 2005) 2, Military Module, 67, 68.

³¹⁶ Uluslararası Güvenlik Yardım Harekati, *Genelkurmay Baskanligi*, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/4_ULUSLARASI_ILISKILER/4_1_Afganistan_Uluslararası_Güvenlik_Yardım_Kuvveti/konular/Turkiyenin_UGYK_Harekatina_Katkilari.htm (accessed November 23, 2008).

³¹⁷ Turkish-U.S. Political Relations, *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa (accessed November 24, 2008).

On November 5, 2007, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited President George Bush in the White House. The meeting was very friendly and delivered cooperation messages afterwards. President Bush described the PKK/KONGRA-GEL as the enemy of both Iraq and the U.S.³¹⁸ In January, President Gul met President Bush in Washington. After the meeting, President Gul said that Turkish-American cooperation against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL had solidified.³¹⁹ The last important visit, in 2008, was held by Dick Cheney, Vice President of the U.S., on March, 24. The friendship between Cheney, President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan had been obvious to the press from the photographs. Gul and Cheney said the integrity of Iraq was the ‘common interest.’ He also advised Gul to enhance the political relations of the Turkish Republic with the regional Kurdish Communities and their leaders in Iraq. Furthermore, he asked for a tougher attitude towards Iran from Erdogan.³²⁰ Although the relations appeared to have improved and “to have turned the corner”³²¹ since 2003, there were still points of discussion.

D. CONTINUING SOURCES OF FRICTION AFTER 2003

The biggest irritant in the relations was the protracted conflict in Iraq marked by the insurgency, which further unsettled the region into 2004-5. After the rejection of the resolution by the parliament on March 1, the relationship was harmed by consequent “shockwaves, leading to the deepening of the crisis,” which was called “a malaise in Turkish-American relations.” Wolfowitz got tough on the Turkish Military, thereby putting the whole blame on the Generals of the Turkish Army for having been passive during the vote of resolution. Wolfowitz exceeded the borders of courtesy in the eyes of the public when he declared, “let’s have a Turkey that steps up and says, we made a

³¹⁸ “Operasyona Yesil Isik,” *Radikal*, November 6, 2007, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/index.php?tarih=06/11/2007> (accessed November 24, 2008).

³¹⁹ Hilal Koylu, “Gul: Amerika’dan Akil Almayiz,” *Radikal*, January 12, 2008, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=244197&tarih=12/01/2008> (accessed November 24, 2008).

³²⁰ Hilal Koylu, “Iki Istek, İki Destek,” *Radikal*, March 25, 2008, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=251160> (accessed November 25, 2008).

³²¹ R. Nicolas Burns, “The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship,” (remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington, September 13, 2007).

mistake, we should have known how bad things were in Iraq, but we know now. Let's figure out how we can be as helpful as possible to the Americans." He also demanded an apology from Turkey. Turkish public perception was that Wolfowitz showed a woeful lack of respect for the Turkish Parliament and Turkish independence.³²²

Another divergence in the relations related to the reconstruction of Iraq after the war. Since Turkey has historical ties with Northern Iraq and its Turkmen population, Turkish officials wanted to be effective in the reconstruction process of Iraq. But Turkey was excluded from this process after the Gulf War of 1991; Kurds were the "stauncest ally" of the U.S. From the perspective of Washington, Turkish existence in Northern Iraq might lead to a war between Turks and Kurds, which would destroy the democratic process that the U.S. wished to establish. Moreover, Americans assume that using Kurds would be more beneficial in Iraq than cooperation with Turkey due to the Turkish "sphere of influence in Iraq," which might be to the detriment of the U.S. in the future.³²³

As the Sulaymaniyah incident was examined above, it will not be re-examined here, but it would be useful to emphasize that this incident derailed Turkish-American relations in terms of mistrust, and it would take a long time to fix it.

The main concern of Turkey in terms of Iraq was the territorial integrity of Iraq. The division of Iraq might have resulted in a Kurdish area in the Northern part, which would affect the Turkish struggle with the Kurdish separatist movement in its southern zone. In 2004, the developments in Iraq, in terms of the constitution and other processes restored some privileges to the Kurds "to the detriment of other Iraqis such as the Shi'as and the Turcomans." The precious oil resources of Kirkuk and Mosul should be redistributed equally among the ethnic groups of Northern Iraq. To get all the benefits of these resources, the Kurds attempted to change the demographic conditions of Mosul and Kirkuk by destroying the records of the population and land registry institutions in March, 2004. Turkey threatened to act unilaterally towards Northern Iraq but Zalmay

³²² Gozen, "Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003," 88, 89.

³²³ Ibid., 90.

Khalilzad, the U.S. Envoy, warned Turkey that it would be a “tragedy for the U.S.-Turkish relations.”³²⁴ Thus, Ankara refrained from any operations but pursued a diplomatic solution. Although American soldiers re-established public order in Mosul and Kirkuk, both cities had already been exposed to a demographic shift.³²⁵

Surely the worst sticking point has been the fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Although reciprocal visits have been held since 2003, and mutual guarantees and promises have been put forward, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is still active in Northern Iraq. Even though the PKK/KONGRA-GEL announced a ceasefire after Abdullah Ocalan was jailed in 1999, since 2004, members of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL re-launched an armed campaign against Turkish soldiers and citizens. Despite Ankara’s repeated calls to Washington to destroy PKK/KONGRA-GEL camps in Northern Iraq, Washington preferred to ignore the situation based on the fear of instability in other regions of Iraq due to an insufficiency of troops. Also, Washington refrained from alienating the Kurds as the stability of Iraq depended upon their help.³²⁶ After the PKK/KONGRA-GEL attacks towards the end of 2007 that “left 40 Turks dead,” TGNA passed a resolution regarding a military operation in Northern Iraq. Washington “sought to dissuade Turkey from taking such action” and called for reconciliation with “the regional government in Northern Iraq.”³²⁷ These debates ended fruitlessly.

However, Yasar Buyukanit, former Turkish Chief of General staff, announced in December 2007 that a high-level of cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. had been established and Ankara executed a hot-pursuit of the terrorists via unmanned air vehicles. Thus, a new trust between Turkey and the U.S. seemed to appear in terms of ongoing U.S operations in the region. However, the very recent attacks in Aktutun, Hakkari on

³²⁴ Gozen, “Causes and Consequences of Turkey’s Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003,” 94, quoted in *Middle East International*, no. 596, (March 21, 2003): 14.

³²⁵ Ibid., 93,94.

³²⁶ Ian O. Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving Beyond Geopolitics,” *Colloquium Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context*, Strategic Studies Institute (April 2008), 78.

³²⁷ Frances G. Burwell, “Rebuilding U.S.-Turkey Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” *Colloquium Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context*, Strategic Studies Institute (April 2008), 6.

October 5, 2008 and Diyarbakir on October 8, that resulted in the deaths of fifteen soldiers, four police officers and one civil servant drew attention to the words of General Buyukanit and mistrust of the U.S once more. The cooperation against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL began to be questioned and opened up public debates. Yet, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL still stands as the most urgent problem waiting to be solved in terms of mutual cooperation.

Consequently, approaches to Iran diverged significantly. Turkey shifted its policy towards Iran after the Iraq War. Apparently, Turkey's trade with Iran boosted to “\$4 billion in 2005” from “\$1 billion in 2000.” Ankara is against a strong nuclear power in its southern flank but does not support tough measures against Iran. As Tayyip Erdogan mentioned, “The continuation of Iran's nuclear program for peaceful ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns [the development] of weapons of mass destruction.” Turkey also benefits from over one million Iranian tourists every year.³²⁸ After seeing Washington's apparent ignorance of Turkish calls regarding the prevention of an independent Kurdish State, Iran and Turkey, sharing the same concerns on the issue, expanded cooperation in diplomatic and economic areas. Turkey supported counter-measures on behalf of international institutes like the UN. Ankara gave a wide berth to military solutions for Iran since it did not want a second Iraq case or instability within its borders. However, the U.S. favors military solutions rather than diplomatic solutions. As “McCain joins Bush in tough-talk and saber-rattling directed at Iran,”³²⁹ they see diplomatic solutions to be fruitless. Therefore, Turkish and American approaches conflict over Iran. Yet, the U.S. encourages Ankara “not to reward Iran by

³²⁸ Yigal Schleifer, “Caught in the Fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Iran's Nuclear Program,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 2, 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0202/p05s01-woeu.html> (accessed November 25, 2008).

³²⁹ Creag Hayes, “The Case for Obama: A Return to Judgment Base on Common Sense,” *The Prague Post*, October 29, 2008, <http://www.praguepost.com/articles/2008/10/29/presidency-push.php> (accessed November 25, 2008).

investing in its oil and gas sector.”³³⁰ Nevertheless, Turkey, having suffered a lot from one-sided foreign policies in the past, tends to preserve a delicate balance in its foreign policy towards both Iran and the U.S.

The *alleged* Armenian Genocide, which the author believes should be called the “Armenian Relocation,” still irritates the bilateral relations. Turkey is very sensitive about this alleged genocide resolution mainly because it was not genocide. Secondly, the idea of genocide flies in the face of traditional Turkish values that have respect for every culture and society. In addition, as explained in the previous chapter, if the term “genocide” is approved, Armenians would follow a policy to take some eastern territories of Turkey as mentioned in Article 11 of the Armenian constitution. For this reason, after the Armenian’s lobbying efforts were unsuccessful, in 2000, related to passing a resolution about the events of 1915, the idea was again put forth in 2007. After the “resolution initially passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee in October 2007,”³³¹ some high-ranking Turkish officials warned the U.S. to think twice about it. Yasar Buyukanit, as the Chief of General Staff at that time, said that “If this resolution passed in the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the U.S. will never be the same again.” He also added that “an allied country does not behave in this way.”³³² However, the U.S. administration expressed their regret about the admission of the resolution by the committee and highlighted their opposition to the resolution. Washington’s opposition is based on fear of the deterioration of cooperation in Iraq as General David Petraeus, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, warned that “...much U.S. military air traffic to Iraq transits through the air base at Incirlik in Turkey.”³³³ Although

³³⁰ R. Nicolas Burns, “The Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship,” (remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington, September 13, 2007).

³³¹ Congressional Initiative to Deem Killings of Armenians as Genocide Stalls in House, *The American Journal of International Law* 102, no. 1 (January 1, 2008):186-187, <http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu> (accessed November 24, 2008).

³³² Molly Moore, “Turkish General Sees U.S. Ties at Risk; Commander Warns Against Passage of Genocide Resolution,” *Washington Post*, October 15, 2007, A.10.

³³³ Congressional Initiative to Deem Killings of Armenians as Genocide Stalls in House, *The American Journal of International Law* 102, no. 1 (January 1, 2008):186-187, <http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu> (accessed November 24, 2008).

Ankara did not choose any specific counter-measures in case of an approval of the resolution by the House of Representatives, the resolution is still pending and has not been submitted to the House of Representatives by Nancy Pelosi. The Turkish press interpreted this as Nancy Pelosi being in a dilemma, as she had promised the Armenians approval of the resolution, but pressures from the Bush administration outweighed her promise. However, unless Nancy Pelosi announces that she relinquished the proposal or that the House of Representatives rejects the proposal, Turkish concerns will not be eliminated.

E. THE WAY AHEAD OUT OF THE BILATERAL IMPASSE

As this author argues, despite certain periods of deterioration, Turkish-American relations are always moving toward improvement, because of the enduring nature of core interests. First of all, “Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran.”³³⁴ In this region, Turkey seems the most trustworthy and powerful ally when taking into consideration the background of the relations.

- Since Turkey is in the center of the heart of the American agenda—the Middle East—any instability in Turkey would inevitably spread to its neighbors, which would never be allowed by the U.S.
- Besides its political importance, Turkey’s geopolitical value is important in the eyes of policy makers in Washington because of its position as the center “for trade and the flow of energy to global markets.” In this context, Turkey’s importance is enhanced by the U.S.’ efforts to reduce the dependency of Western countries on Russia and Iran in terms of natural gas and oil.
- Ankara’s support for the operations of the U.S. against terrorism is a vital factor for Washington to demonstrate to the world that this war is not against Muslims. Having a population of 99 percent Muslim, a Turkish contribution provides a tranquilizing affect for the 1.3 billion Muslims in the world.³³⁵

³³⁴ Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush, “The U.S. and Turkey: End of an Alliance?” *Survival* 49, no. 2, 131.

³³⁵ Ibid., 131, 132.

- To achieve progress and stability in Iraq, a Turkish contribution looks inextricable. Since the U.S. would not be able to continue its existence in Iraq, forever, to a large extent, it would need trusted allies to maintain the stability in Iraq. Turkey, thinking in terms of approximation and trustworthiness in the environment of Iran and Syria, stand out as the best choice for the U.S.
- On the other side, Washington's support is vital for Turkey to enter the EU. Since America is the only hegemon in the world, nobody else can convince the EU to include Turkey when it needs support. Moreover, pressure from Washington's may be helpful for softening some of the tougher policies of some European countries towards Turkey.
- Despite an improving economy, Turkey still needs Washington's support in terms of its economy. It can either be in the form of loans or via the IMF. Additionally, Ankara is eager to expand economic relations with the U.S. to accelerate its investments in Turkey.
- After the Iraq invasion, it became clear that it would be hard for Ankara to carry out the fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL alone. For a successive solution, Ankara has to cooperate with Washington in Northern Iraq.
- Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces favor warmer relations with the U.S. since most Turkish weapons technology depends on the U.S. In order to be a regional power in the midst of an unstable and cloudy zone, Ankara requires a powerful army with strong weapons.

While the key aims are common, differences emerge on the way to these common goals. Thus, steps should be taken in order to prevent a divergence on this road.

- To begin with, Turkish-American relations are asymmetric. “Turkey is a regional power,” therefore its “interests, concerns priorities, and timelines are primarily shaped by localized perceptions,” whereas the U.S. is a global power and has global concerns. This variation results in unequal requests. Turkish priorities fall back on Washington’s agenda and Washington’s requests “do not always sit well with the Turkish mindset.” Therefore, “a better understanding of the nature of the relationship” is vital. Both sides should push themselves to understand the priorities and sensitivities of each other so as to cruise together on the same ship.³³⁶
- To further a stable understanding, both sides should build up consulting processes regarding the implementation of foreign policy to the fields of common interests. This was also foreseen in the document of “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Strategic Partnership.”

³³⁶ O. Faruk Logoglu, “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations: A Turkish Perspective,” *Colloquium Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context*, Strategic Studies Institute (April 2008), 31, 32, 37.

- Another key idea is to expand and diversify economic relations. This should be implemented as a two way street. While Turkey encourages the American entrepreneurs via essential arrangements, the U.S. should do the same for Turkish entrepreneurs. By economic means, if the effects of the Turkish lobby are positive, it may balance the influence of the Greek and Armenian lobbies in Congress.
- The Turkish and American people lack sufficient interaction. Although the military personnel know each other via exchanges of military agreements, this interaction should be dispersed throughout civil society. In this context, the exchange of high school and university students, the personnel of government institutions, “scientists and scholars”³³⁷ will generate an acquaintance between two peoples that will result in more friendly relations.
- Lastly, the general perception in Ankara is that “Washington really does not have a policy toward Turkey *per se*.” The U.S., until today did not have any particular policy for Turkey. On the other hand, Washington’s policies toward Turkey are “derivatives of other American interests.”³³⁸ Ankara feels uncomfortable due to the non-existence of a direct Turkish policy. To overcome this problem, Washington should “put Turkey at the center of regional diplomacy”³³⁹ regarding the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans. As a result, Ankara would feel honored by Washington’s gesture and would push itself to be more pro-active to the advantage of the U.S. in the region.

From these perspectives, Washington should guarantee Turkey in terms of the political and territorial integrity of Iraq, since Ankara flinches at a separatist movement in its southeastern territory, due to any instigation from Northern Iraq. Therefore, the U.S. should adhere in an unwavering fashion to the territorial integrity of Iraq. Additionally, Washington should lend an ear to Ankara’s calls and take them seriously regarding the fight with the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. This policy is very important for Turkey, having suffered thirty thousand deaths since 1984. In response, Turkey should be more active and supportive of American policies in Iraq, which should comfort Washington in the long term, both economically and diplomatically.

³³⁷ Logoglu, “The State of U.S.-Turkey Relations: A Turkish Perspective,” 38.

³³⁸ Larrabee and Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an age of Uncertainty*, 165.

³³⁹ Ian O Lesser, “The State of U.S.-Turkish Relations: Moving Beyond Geopolitics,” *Colloquium Report: The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context*, Strategic Studies Institute (April 2008) 47.

Even though Turkey and the U.S. oppose a “nuclear-armed Iran,” Ankara holds off giving full support related to its isolation.³⁴⁰ Ankara refrains from getting as tough as the U.S. over Iran since it has developed significant economic relations with Iran. Nevertheless, Ankara pushes for full support of the U.S. regarding Iran via diplomatic solutions. by means of the UN and other international institutions. Therefore, instead of forcing Turkey to implement tough measures against Iran, the U.S. should seek a solution using international institutions that would result in Turkey’s support. With this process, the U.S. administration could take advantage of Turkey as an energy hub, which would eventually isolate Iran. Although “the Bush administration inherited” this project from his predecessors, it was neglected and thus failed to improve.³⁴¹ Contrary to what the Bush administration believes, it would be useful to revitalize this project.

Consequently, in order to prevent the Armenian and Greek lobbies from harming relations, the U.S. administration should be a pro-active. Congress should not proceed with passing the political resolution of the Armenian incidents of 1915, and this issue should never be considered again. The best option for this kind of solution would be to go through a powerful Turkish lobby in Congress. Until the establishment of a powerful Turkish lobby, temporary solutions should include taking advantage of the Israeli and other lobbies to counter the Armenian and Greek ones.

The easiest way to conquer the heart of Ankara is to keep the ball rolling in terms of supporting Turkey for the EU ticket. While Turkey pursues the goal of reaching the EU standards, the U.S. should be Ankara’s sponsor to prove Turkey’s eligibility and maturity in meeting the criteria of the EU. All the essential points mentioned above should construct the supports of a strong bridge in a friendly atmosphere.

³⁴⁰ Frank Carlucci and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Revitalizing U.S.-Turkey Relations,” *Washington Times*, The (DC), June 8, 2005.

³⁴¹ Mark R. Parris, “Common Values and Common Interests? The Bush Legacy in U.S.-Turkish Relations,” *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 4, (2008): 8.

F. CONCLUSION

Turkish-American Relations were at their lowest point in 2003. The relations were frustrated by the consequent shock waves: rejection of a second front resolution by TGNA and the Sulaymaniyah Incident. Although the future appeared cloudy at times, efforts toward revitalization of the relations were fruitful and eventually the trend showed improvement. Due to the U.S.' interests in the Middle East, in terms of geography, Turkey seems the most appropriate candidate for a successful solution in the future. From a Turkish point of view, no one could be more helpful to a country, after a rapidly developing process in terms of the economic and political areas, than the U.S.

By the way, it is interesting to note that the anti-Americanism in Turkey after 2003 was not against American culture. Most of the polls indicated that the Turkish public "has sympathy towards American culture, ideas about democracy and business practices." However, what the Turkish public opposed were the policies of the Bush administration. "According to some surveys...by Poll Mark Company...81.5 percent of respondents are not happy about Bush's policies while only 5.6 percent approve of President Bush."³⁴²

Indeed, Mark R. Parris, the former U.S. Ambassador. in Ankara, confirms and blames the Bush Administration for mismanagement of the relations. He mainly argues about Bush's "insensitivity to Turkish interests [and] Inaction against PKK/KONGRA-GEL,"³⁴³ which gave birth to intense public opposition. Therefore, considering these data, it would be appropriate to underline that, in fact, the Turkish public is not an anti-American community; it may even be pro-American in terms of democratic ideas and institutions.

³⁴² Guney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," 482.

³⁴³ Parris, "Common Values and Common Interests? The Bush Legacy in U.S.-Turkish Relations," 7.

VI. CONCLUSION

This thesis interprets the substance of continuity in crisis in the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. since WWII. At the outset, the beginning of Turkish-American relations dating back to the early nineteenth century had been weak. From the end of WWII until today, the relations went through periods of improvement and deterioration as a result of factors in the international system. When the convergence of mutual interests was strong, as they were in the 1950s against a Soviet threat, the relations intensified in a positive sense. In contrast, when divergences of policy were strong as in the 1960s and 70s, related to Cyprus, the relations became “allergic and sensitive.” Nevertheless, as this thesis demonstrates, the relations accelerated towards the positive side of the meter after every episode of divergence., This fact proves that “the areas of convergence have been more pronounced than the areas of divergence over the two hundred years of connection and more than fifty years of close cooperation.”³⁴⁴

A strong relationship could not be established in the 1800s as the aspects of the relationship were restricted to an economic dimension only. Furthermore, the geographic distance between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. constrained a productive and manifold relationship. Moreover, the nature of the decline of the Ottoman empire as well as the lack of a world-wide reach of American diplomacy were additional complicating factors until well into the twentieth century. However, those years might be assessed as the result of close security cooperation after WWII, when the Ottoman Empire was an important recipient of U.S.-made arms.

The weak relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. ended after WWI because of the extinction of the Ottoman Empire. A newborn nation-state, the Republic of Turkey emerged from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Despite a strong willingness to cooperate with the U.S. emerging from Ataturk’s principles related to the Westernization of Turkey, the new Republic of Turkey was so busy with domestic issues

³⁴⁴ Aydin and Erhan, *Turkish American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, 247.

that these issues impeded Ankara from expanding relations with the U.S. Despite this fact, the sincere friendship between Ataturk and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was remarkable, and showed Turkish sympathy towards America.

In contrast to the sporadic relationship before WWII, Turkish-American relations were boosted by the end of WWII as a result of new common threats: the Soviet Union and a growing U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Despite a close relationship at this time, it is hard to say that the relationship was built on a strategic concept. The U.S. became a kind of “big brother” to Turkey as British influence in the region went into decline. Washington set Ankara up with military supplies and in return, Ankara stood against the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union. The relationship was on track until the U.S. administration signed an agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in 1962. However, it did not produce a significant divergence in the relations due to the positive efforts of the Turkish Parliament.

Consequently, the letter by President Johnson in 1964, which related to the cancellation of the intervention attempt of Turkey into Cyprus, was the deepest shock in the history of U.S.-Turkish relations. Since the President’s tone was very harsh in the letter, it caused a great deal of anti-American feeling among Turkish citizens. This negative wave became even bigger when the U.S. administration pressured Ankara to put a ban on opium production. Moreover, the arms embargo that was put on Turkey by Congress, as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, brought the ties to the point of unraveling.

After experiencing the beginning of this unraveling, as this thesis presents, the relations were regulated once again. The re-emergence of the Soviet threat in the 1980s adducted the two countries back to each other. This time, Turkey was eager to expand relations from security to economic and political areas. The First Gulf War provided this opportunity for Turkey and a diverse relationship was launched. During President Clinton’s administration, mutual cooperation reached its peak. After 9/11, cooperation became more important and meaningful in terms of the common fight against terrorism.

After 9/11, in terms of the fight against terrorism, Turkey pursued a balanced relationship with the U.S. in the context of mutual benefits and compliance with international institutions like the UN. On the other hand, the Bush administration acted on its own, regardless of the international institutions, which resulted in an uncomfortable situation in Turkey and with its European allies. Subsequently, Paul Wolfowitz's public denunciations of Turkey, and President Bush's unfriendly tone regarding the situation in Northern Iraq after the Turkish Parliament rejected the American proposal of a second Turkish/Iraq front on March 1, 2003, the relations began to spiral downwards. After the incident of July 4, 2003 in Sulaymaniyah, the word coming from most of the Turkish citizens was "enough: this is the end." At this time, the situation was at its worst. The close relationship and "distinctive alliance"³⁴⁵ of the years was about to go down the drain.

Even though this step was interpreted as the beginning of deterioration and a detaching process, the future reversed the interpretations and accelerated towards the better.. Mutual visits, an enhanced partnership, and a deeper reciprocal understanding overwhelmed the impaired parts of the relationship. "Shared vision" and the cooperation over the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorist organization were the most fruitful products of this recently advanced partnership.

As this thesis demonstrates, the relations in the last fifty years experienced ups and downs of policy and strategy. But the important point is that the two countries never broke up their security alliance despite highly difficult issues of policy, be it in the 1960s, the 1970s, or in the immediate past. Any deterioration was followed by an improvement. This proves that Turkish-American relations tend to improvement despite some periods of deterioration as both countries share the common core interests mentioned in the chapters above. Hence, in contrast to the scenarios of doomsday after 2003 proffered by many critics on both sides, the alliance did not come to an end, but began to improve again, the signals of which are clear today. It should be acknowledged that impaired relations do not mean the end of an alliance, since members of an alliance do not have to

³⁴⁵ Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, 1.

share exactly the same points of view. Divergences on certain issues might sometimes be inevitable. Nevertheless, in a world of rapid change and diverse interests, Washington's new policies toward some of the Middle East countries, like Iran, Syria and Iraq, push for a strong alliance with a trusted ally, Turkey. In an environment where benefits outweigh term and region regarding an alliance with Turkey, from the author's point of view, the divergences would not be as important. Yet this does not mean that there will be no divergence in interests, only that they will not be at the top of the agenda. They will be taken into consideration secondarily, after the benefits.

Finally, the author would like to quote Ataturk's calling to the American people, which demonstrates the close and positive relationship and the core shared principles between Turkey and the U.S.

Dearest Americans, I would like to mention a few words about the natural origin of the undeniable sincere relationship between the people of Turkey and those of the United States of America. The Turks are already a Democratic Nation. If this true fact has not been understood by today's civilized world I must direct attention to the remarkable comments made by our ambassador regarding the last days of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand the American people have always relied and depended on democracy to identify them as a nation since their inception. It has been through this blessing that they have been placed amongst today's civilized world as a new nation. This has given them acceptance as a new nation. Thus the Turkish people feel a strong sentiment of love and understanding towards the American people. I do hope that the observation of this fact will encourage further dialog and warm relations between the two nations; but this will not be all. I am sure that this will also allow the rest of the civilized world to have more goodwill towards one another and erase all past negative fables and experiences, thus leading the world towards a more peaceful and lawful existence. Dear Americans; as a proud representative of the Turkish nation I give you this as a goal and sole purpose of the new Turkish people. I have no doubt that the American nation who has already reached this ultimate goal shall understand and join the new Turkish nation.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁶ "Ataturk's Address to the people of America," <http://www.aboutataturk.org/> (accessed November 29, 2008).

Taking Ataturk's words into consideration, Turkey and the U.S. should cooperate on a wide range of issues, as there are far more common viewpoints than divergences. For this reason, a positive prediction in terms of improvement for the future of the relations would not be wrong.

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